AXIO-SYSTEMIC VALIDITY: POSITIVISM WITH REASON
Systemic validity is generally in conformity with the understanding of
validity adopted by legal officials. On the other hand, it suffers from an inability
to account for why an enactment in conformity with the systemic criteria
constitutes a norm. Axio-systemic validity aims to compensate this deficiency by
introducing a hybrid understanding of validity. While the systemic component
continues the descriptive and explanatory advantages, the minimum axiological
element guarantees that the enactments possess the character of norms. While
axio-systemic validity violates the social fact and sources theses, it is compatible
with the separability thesis. Therefore, it can be conceived of as a positivist
understanding of validity
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