Two Tokens of the Inference to the Best Explanation: No-Miracle Argument and the Selectionist Explanation

Bu makalede van Fraassen'in En İyi Açıklamaya Çıkarım (EİAÇ) görüşüne getirdiği "kötünün iyisi" itirazını ele alacağım. İlk olarak getirilen eleştirinin, bir çıkarım kuralı olarak EİAÇ'nin güvenilirliğine dair olduğunu tartışacağım. İkinci olarak, bilim felsefesi literatüründe en meşhur gerçekçi EİAÇ'lerden biri olarak anılan Mucize Olamaz (MO) argümanını ele alacağım. Mark Newman'ın gerçekçi EİAÇ eleştirisine bağlı kalarak, EİAÇ'nin bir kısır döngü ihtiva ettiğini tartışacağım. Üçüncü olarak, EİAÇ'nin karşıtgerçekçi alternatifi olan ve van Fraassen tarafından ortaya koyulan Seçilimci Açıklama (SA)'yı ortaya koyacağım. Sonuç olarak her ne kadar van Fraassen EİAÇ'yi eksik ve kusurlu buluyor olsa da SA da bir EİAÇ formuna sahiptir ve o halde, aynı zamanda SA da bir EİAÇ örnekçesidir.

En İyi Açıklamaya Çıkarım'ın İki Türcesi: Mucize Olamaz Argümanı ve Seçilimci Açıklama

In this paper, I evaluate van Fraassen's critique of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by focusing mainly on his argument of bad lot. First, I argue that his attack is about the reliability of IBE as a rule of inference. Secondly, I evaluate the most famous realist IBE in the philosophy of science literature, namely the No-Miracle Argument (NMA). I stick to Mark Newman's attack to realist NMA and admit his claim that NMA is viciously circular. Thirdly, I introduce the anti-realist alternative to the NMA, which is argued by van Fraassen, namely the Selectionist Explanation. Ultimately, I claim that, even though van Fraassen finds IBE wanting, SA has a form of IBE and thus it is a token of IBE as well

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