Is Ignorance a Part of Virtue?

This article basically addresses the issue of what kind of level of consciousness man has when trying to make virtuousness part of his character. In this discussion, Aristotle argues that the entrenchedness of virtue necessitates a process accompanied by consciousness. There is a close connection between the emergence of this consciousness in man and practical wisdom. A person with practical wisdom is a person who has made virtuousness a part of his character rather than someone who has managed to act in accordance with certain moral principles. Julia Driver, on the other hand, does not deny the thesis that virtue as a whole requires consciousness. However, she believes that at least some, if not all, of the virtues, have been rooted without man's consciousness and will. So that, the entrenchedness of certain virtues, such as modesty, does not require a process of consciousness. In this article, in the context of the virtue-knowledge relationship, the thesis is defended that the virtue of modesty involves a realistic attitude in which one can feel one's own reality in its simplest form. Accordingly, the modest person is aware of what kind of person he should be, but he has not fully grasped the relationship between the value he has and the virtue of modesty.

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