Silahlı Çatışma Hukukunda Yapay Zeka Silah Sistemleri İçin Komuta Sorumluluğu

Uluslararası insancıl hukuk ve uluslararası ceza hukuku uyarınca, bireyler işledikleri tüm savaş suçlarından cezai olarak sorumludur. Otonom silah sistemleri tarafından işlenen savaş suçlarından kimin sorumlu tutulabileceği ise belirsizdir. Silah sistemlerinde yapay zekanın kullanılması; operasyonel kuvvetlerin savaş ortamını anlamak, hedefleri belirlemek, izlemek ve seçmek, onları en uygun etkilerle yok etmek için sensörleri birleştirme yeteneğini geliştirir. Yapay zekanın ölüm zincirini kapatmaya yardımcı olma potansiyeli, insanların kararları ile makinelerin eylemleri arasında hesap verebilirlikte bir boşluk yarattığı ve insanların artık silahlı çatışmalar sırasında alınan kararlardan sorumlu olmadığı endişesini artırdı. Bu çalışma, askeri komutanın tüm savaş yöntem ve araçlarının kullanılmasından her zaman doğrudan ve bireysel olarak sorumlu olduğu için bir boşluk olmadığını göstermektedir. Komutanın askeri sorumluluğu savaş alanını kaplar. Bu sorumluluk, yapay zeka silah sistemlerinin kullanımı da dahil olmak üzere savaşta kullanılan kuvvet yapısına, silah sistemlerine ve taktiklere bağlıdır. Askeri hesap verebilirlik, askeri görevin temelidir ve silahlı çatışma hukukuna veya uluslararası insancıl hukuka uymaya ilişkin yasal yükümlülüğü içerir. Komutan, üstü askeri, sivil liderlere karşı sorumludur ve uluslararası ceza hukuku da dahil olmak üzere askeri düzen ve disiplin yoluyla uygulanan siyasi, kurumsal ve yasal yaptırımlara tabidir. Komutanın doğrudan ve bireysel sorumluluğu doktrini, üst düzey askeri liderlerin, otonom silah sistemlerinin gözetimi, seçimi ve kullanımı dahil olmak üzere hukuk ve liderlik ihlallerinden sorumlu olmasını sağlar. Bu makale, yapay zekanın kullanıldığı otonom silah sistemlerinin, komuta sorumluluğunda yarattığı problemleri inceleyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

yapay zeka, otonom silah sistemleri, komuta sorumluluğu

COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AI WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Autonomous weapon systems can select and engage targets without meaningful human intervention. In light of developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning technology, autonomous weapon systems are likely to become a central feature of today's armed conflicts. Who is responsible when autonomous weapons systems commit a war crime is still being debated. In this article, to whom responsibility should be attributed will be examined in the context of command responsibility. Autonomous weapon systems destroy the chain of command in line with their ability to make decisions on their own. While the commander is expected to discipline his troops, to what extent will it be possible for autonomous systems consisting of algorithms. Military discipline systems prescribe punitive measures to ensure that the rules are followed. But artificial intelligence cannot be punished therefore it will not be able to respond to disciplinary actions. There are two main research questions that will be examined in this article. Because of systems that can make their own decisions through autonomy and artificial intelligence, when can a reasonable commander knew or should have known that an autonomous weapon system is about to commit a crime? What necessary and reasonable measures should commanders take to carry out their preventive duties? The concept of command responsibility regulates the relationship between human commanders and their subordinates. In the Rome statute, the commander is the person who exercises authority over military activities, but the commanders and subordinates are always considered human beings therefore the concept of command responsibility should be interpreted in light of the new developments in military technology.

Keywords:

artificial intelligence, command responsibility, autonomous weapon systems,

PDF

___

ANDERSON, K., and WAXMAN, M. (2013). Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can. California: Hoover Institution.
ANDERSON, K. (2009). The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences. European Journal of International Law, 331-358.
ANDERSON, K., REISNER, D., and WAXMAN, M. (2014). Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems. International Law Studies, 386-406.
ANTHONY, I., and HOLLAND, C. (2014). The Governance of Autonomous Weapons. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
ARKIN, R. (2009). Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots. London: Routledge.
BADAR, M., and PORRO, S. (2015). Rethinking the Mental Elements in the Jurisprudence of the ICC. C. Stahn içinde, The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (s. 665). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BASSIOUNI, M. C. (2013). Introduction to International Criminal Law. Leiden: Brill.
BO, M. (2021). Autonomous Weapons and the Responsibility Gap in light of the Mens Rea of the War Crime of Attacking Civilians in the ICC Statute. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 289.
BOHLANDER, M. (2009). Principles of German Criminal Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
CASSESE, A. (2003). International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
COCKBURN, A. (2016). Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins. London: Picador.
D'AMATO, A. (1986). Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility. American Journal of International Law, 607.
GARRAWAY, C. (1999). Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice Delivered or Justice Denied. International Review of the Red Cross, 787.
GÜNEYSU, G. (2022). Otonom Silah Sistemleri: Bir Uluslararası Hukuk İncelemesi. Eskişehir: Nisan Yayınları.
HAMMOND, D. (2014). Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability. Chicago Journal of International Law, 652-687.
HENCKAERTS, J. M., and BECK, L. D. (2005). Customary International Humanitarian Law. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
HOROWITZ, M. (2016). Why Words Matter: The Real World Consequences of Defining Autonomous Weapons Systems. Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 85.
HOVEN, J., and SANTONI DE SIO, F. (2018). Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account. Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 4.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. (2014). Shaking the Foundations: The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots. Geneva: HRW.
JAIN, N. (2013). Individual Responsibility for Mass Atrocity: In Search of a Concept of Perpetration. American Journal of Comparative Law, 831.
MARGULIES, P. (2017). Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts. J. D. Ohlin in, Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (s. 405). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
MARRA, W., and MCNEIL, S. (2013). Understanding The Loop: Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 61.
MELONI, C. (2007). Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior? Journal of International Criminal Justice, 620.
OHLIN, J. D. (2016). The Combatant's Stance: Autonomous Weapons on the Battlefield. International Law Studies, 22.
PARKS, W. (1973). Command Responsibility for War Crimes. Military Law Review, 22.
PROSECUTOR V FURUNDŽIJA, IT-95-17/1-T (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 12 10, 1998).
PROSECUTOR V MUCIĆ , IT-96-21-T (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 11 16, 1998).
PROSECUTOR V. BLAŠKIĆ, IT-95-14-A (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 07 29, 2004).
PROSECUTOR V. HALILOVIC, IT-01-48-T (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 11 16, 2005).
PROSECUTOR V. KORDIĆ, IT-95-14/2-A (International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia 12 17, 2004).
PROSECUTOR V. KRNOJELAC, IT-97-25-A (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 09 17, 2003).
PROSECUTOR V. TADIĆ, IT-94-1-T (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 05 07, 1997).
ROFF, H. (2013). Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability, and Lethal Autonomous Robots. F. Allhoff, N. Evans, and A. Henschke içinde, Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in the 21st Century (s. 354). London: Routledge.