Anayasanın ekonomik analizi: Bir oyun teorisi yaklaşımı

Bu makale, anayasa üzerine bir Hukuk ve Ekonomi perspektifi sunmayı amaçlanmaktadır. Makale iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, bir anayasanın ekonomik analizinde, anayasal sözleşme ve süreçlerin özellikle Hukuk ve Ekonomi literatürü açısından ne anlam ifade ettiğini tartışmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, anayasa yapma süreçlerinde çıkar gruplarının rolünü ve oyun teorisi perspektifinden anayasa değişikliğini analiz etmektedir. Özellikle bir rant arama toplumunda anayasa yapma süreçleri, özel çıkar grupları perspektifinden ele alınmakta ve yasa koyucu ile çıkar grupları arasındaki ilişki incelenmektedir. Son olarak makale, bir anayasa yapma sürecinde seçmen ve politika yapıcı arasındaki etkileşime, asimetrik bilgi ve güvenilir taahhüt bağlamında oyun teorik bir yaklaşım getirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

ekonomik analizler

Economic analysis of constitution: A game theory approach

This paper aims to present a law and economic perspective over constitution. The paper consists of two sections. The first section discusses what the constitutional contract and processes in economic analysis of a constitution mean specifically in terms of Law and Economics literature. The second section analyzes the role of interest groups in a constitution making process and a constitution amendment from a game theoretical perspective. In particular, the constitution making processes in a rentseeking society is analyzed from the perspective of private interest groups and the interaction between a law-maker and interest groups is considered. Lastly, the paper introduces a game theoretical approach in the context of asymmetric information and a credible commitment to the interaction between constituent as a principal and policy maker as an agent in the constitution making processes.

Keywords:

economic analysis,

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