Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Tanzimat reformu ile başlayan modernleşme sürecinin tebârüz ettiği en önemli alanlardan birisi hukuktur. Batılılaşma yönündeki güçlü eğilim 1858 tarihli Arâzi Kânûnnâmesi ile Ahmet Cevdet Paşa'nın ısrarı ve çabalarıyla hazırlanan Mecelle-i Ahkam-ı Adliyye istisna edilirse Cumhuriyet dönemine kadar sürmüş ve Cumhuriyet dönemindeki külli resepsiyon ile tekâmül noktasına ulaşmıştır. Her şeye rağmen bu sancılı sürecin fikri anlamda oldukça münbit ve hareketli olduğunu kabul etmek yerinde olacaktır. Cumhuriyet dönemi devlet adamlarının külli resepsiyon kararıyla batı kânunları lehine neticelenen süreç, kânunların karşılaştırıldığı, birçok verimli tartışmanın yapıldığı ve hukukun değişik alanlarında mukâyeseli eserlerin ortaya konduğu bir zaman dilimi olarak Türk hukuk târihi açısından oldukça ehemmiyet arz etmektedir. Bu anlamda o günkü hukuk fakültesinin de programına alınan mukâyeseli medeni hukuk dersinin ifası Profesör Mişon Ventura 'ya tevdi edilmiş ve Ventura ders takrirlerini Mukâyese-i Kavânin-i Medeniye ismiyle bastırmış ve devam eden yıllarda da bu dersi vermeye devam etmiştir. Ventura'nın eseri gerek Türk hukuk târihinde gerekse umûmî hukuk târihinde önemli bir kilometre taşı teşkil etmektedir. Bu önemine rağmen Prof. Bülent Davran'ın mücmel değerlendirmesi dışında esere pek az değinilmiş ve Ventura'nın görüşleri şimdiye kadar eleştirel bir tetkikin konusunu teşkil etmemiştir. Bu çalışmada öncelikli olarak Ventura'nın Mukâyese-i Kavânin-i Medeniye isimli eserinin önsözünde serdettiği görüşler mukâyeseli hukukun bugün geldiği noktayı nazardan tetkik edilecektir. Çalışmada takip edilecek usûl ise özetle şöyle sıralanabilir. Çalışmada mukâyeseli hukukun tanımını müteakip, modern dönemde yazılmış mukâyeseli hukuk eserlerindeki iki başlık, mukâyeseli hukukun diğer disiplinlerle olan ilişkisi ve mukâyeseli hukukta gaye problemi, Ventura'nın görüşlerinin değerlendirilmesindeki ana çerçeveyi çizecektir. Mukâyeseli hukukun diğer disiplinlerle ilişkisinin değerlendirilmesi bağlamında, Ventura'nın mukâyeseli hukuku sadece hukuk târihine taalluk eden boyutuyla ele almış olması hasebiyle, diğer disiplinler ile alakası değerlendirme dışında tutulmuştur. Gaye problemi ise çalışmanın en merkezi konusu olup, Ventura'ya yöneltilebilecek temel eleştirilerin odak noktasını teşkil etmektedir

In the Ottoman Empire, one of the most important areas of the modernization process that began with the Tanzimat reforms is the law. A strong tendency towards westernization, instigated at the insistence and efforts of Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895), proceeded until the Republican era, with the exception of Arâzi Kânûnnâmesi (1858) and Mecelle-i Ahkam-ı Adliyye (1869-1876). This process reached its evolution with a full reception of foreign law in the Republican era. Despite a range of critiques, it must be acknowledged that this painful process was quite fertile and intellectually active. The modernization process resulted in substantial adoption of Western law, due to the acceptance of foreign law by the statesmen of the Republican era. This law-building process was the result of significant analysis, comparison of various legal codes, and detailed discussion and dialogue, along with many publication works in a range of law areas. The era, thus, is quite imporant in the Turkish history of law. Due to this significant process at the time, comparative civil law curricula and lectures had been added to the schedule of the law faculty of that day, and Professor Mison Ventura had been appointed as a lecturer in this area. He printed his notes as a book entitled, Mukâyese-i Kavânin-i Medeniye, and he continued his lectures in later years. In both the Turkish history of law and the general history of law, Ventura’s work has become a milestone and marker. Despite its importance, however, and with the exception of Prof. Bülent Davran’s short critique, Ventura’s work has not been referenced frequently, and the author’s views have not been critically examined. The current article fills this gap. In this article, Ventura’s views that are asserted and outlined in the preface of Mukâyese-i Kavânin-i Medeniye, are examined on the basis of modern comparative law. In this article’s analysis of Ventura’s work, two procedures upon which modern doctrine of comparative law is based are defined, and it is illustrated that Ventura’s procedure has been identified as micro procedure of comparative law. By utilizing the systematics of the modern comparative law works, the relations between comparative law and other disciplines is illuminated, the views of the modern doctrine is briefly discussed, along with the author’s perspective within the scope of the relation between comparative law and the history of law, and the functions of comparative law are outlined. Some disciplines of the modern doctrine, such as sociology or anthropology and their relations to comparative law, are not included in this study, as Ventura does not mention these disciplines in his work. That author considers that comparative law and the history of law are parts of one discipline, and each one of them completes the other. It is determined that the author’s view is similar to the modern doctrine. Ventura expects that comparative law shall be realistic and pragmatic, which centers the law systems in force as the subject of the comparative law. Ventura determines that there are two functions with which comparative law is charged - the improvement of national law, i.e., gap-filling, and the functions of comparative law regarding economy-law perspective. In fact, the author considers these two functions to be the purpose of comparative law. As for the improvement of national law, the role of comparative law in this area, through the example of international sales law, is argued. As a result, the author claims that either receiving or remaining insistent about the national law might be a solution, in line with the modern doctrine and also the author’s perspective. Regarding gapfilling, the author, pertaining to the consequences of comparing Western law and national law, states that there could be similarity or diversity. As a result, the basic philosophy of Western law would help national law fill its gap in the case of similarity; on the other hand, in the case of diversity, the law which provides better provisions for the protection of economic needs will be determined and the reception of it will become necessary. In the first case, the reasons of the solution of an issue in the Western law will be added to the solution of the national law and the national law will be strengthened. Therefore, the author does not have an opinion that centers the Western law; he considers the Western law as an instrument which legitimizes the solutions of the comparative law. On the subject of gap-filling by comparison, Ventura, in accordance with the modern comparative law approach, gives comparative law one more function, which is the solution of not legalization of some issues by lawmakers, consciously or unconsciously. The author claims that when two different codes have the same solution to an issue, that means these two codes have the same basic principle which leads us to understand they have the same philosophy. If that is the case, the issues that are not solved could be solved through the basic principles and the philosophy. Conversely, when the codes having the same solution to the issue does not lead us to them having the same philosophy, the author’s views about this topic are debatable. According to Ventura, the most important function of comparative law is preparing codes that will serve to increase social welfare and the wealth of nation. Put another way, the author considers the improvement of the West is based on preparing codes that suit the economic needs; therefore, he believes that we could have the same improvement if we follow the same method. In another work by this author, the author mentions an argument about whether or not the law as a science is independent, even though he does not reveal a committed response, and he shows his hesitation about the topic. Hence, it is clear that the author does not regard comparative law as an independent discipline; he considers it to be an instrument. Ventura’s view about the economy-law relation, within the realm of the three approaches to this topic, seems to be one of liberal thoughts; in particular, it is determined his views are close to the ideas of Weber and the economic analysis. Consequently, the fundamental criticism aimed at Ventura is that he seems to work within a limited framework and intellectual paradigm, restricted by very popular phrases like improvement, prosperity, and welfare, regarding the purpose of comparative law. This intellectual paradigm leads the author to consider comparative law as a method, rather than an independent dicipline. The effects of his pragmatic approach are seen in later years, and it prevents comparative law from becoming an independent discipline. All in all, despite this fundamental criticism, however, Ventura’s work is far beyond his era. In this current article, the following steps and topics are covered. Following a definition of comparative law, there is discussion of the two titles of modern comparative law works, the relations between comparative law and other disciplines, and the purpose of comparative law. These topics will lay out the basic framework of the critique of Ventura’s views. Within the scope of the relations between comparative law and other disciplines, only the history of law is a subject of this study, since Ventura also only mentions the relation between comparative law and the history of law. The purpose issue is the center of this current study, and is also the focal point of the critique of Ventura.