Soodabeh SOLEYMANI, Faramarz FAGHIHI, Noorollah FARDAD

Reduction of PMUs via hybrid PMU-RTU communication changeover in the case of cyberattack on vulnerable power transmission lines

A power grid strictly depends on information and communication technology. The key role of real-timemeasurement and information control for the reliable operation of a power grid is the responsibility of the phasemeasurement units (PMUs). As smart power grids encounter a variety of unauthorized malicious accesses such ascyberattacks, PMU placement is an important problem. In this study, a new algorithm was proposed to specify theminimum number of PMUs in the case of cyberattacks on their communication lines and equipment. In order to analyzecomplete observability of the distribution system, a range of probable contingencies for the vulnerable lines of a typicalpower system was discussed. The proposed algorithm implementation shows that the number of required PMUs canbe reduced by removing irrelevant information through cyberattack circumstance intervals by using communicationequipment potential.

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