Ruzhi XU, Dawei CHEN, Qizhuo ZONG, Jia LUO

A cross-space cascading failure hazard assessment method considering betweenness centrality and power loss

In order to accurately assess the hazard caused by cross-space cascading failure in the cyber-physical power system, we propose a quantitative assessment method. This method builds a comprehensive framework of assessment that takes into account the betweenness centrality of attack graph and the consequences of failure. The betweenness centrality of each node in the attack graph is used to characterize the frequency of failure. By calculating the number of all nodes on each attack path, the frequency of a certain fault is calculated. The power loss of physical node caused by each cross-space cascading failure is used to characterize the consequences of the fault, which is combined with the frequency of failure and the urgency of troubleshooting to calculate the hazard assessment value of the cross-space cascading failure. Finally, a variety of cross-space cascading failures are implemented in the simulation environment of local cyber-physical power system and their hazards are evaluated. The effectiveness of the proposed assessment method is verified.

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