Örgütsel açıdan yolsuzluk: Kavramsal yönü, özelliği, işletme çevresi, örgütsel davranış ve örgüt mimarisi bağlamında bir inceleme

Bu çalışmanın amacı, son yıllarda en çok konuşulan konulardan biri olan yolsuzluk olgusunu örgütsel açıdan incelenmektir. Bu amaçla bu çalışmada, öncelikle yolsuzluk ve yolsuzluk türlerinin kavramsal çerçevesi ortaya konulmuştur. Türkiye’yi hedef alan yolsuzlukla ilgili araştırmaların sonuçları ve önemli bulgularına değinildikten sonra yolsuzluk konusu örgütsel açıdan irdelenmiştir. Büyük oranda, Luo tarafından geliştirilen modelden istifade edilerek yolsuzluk ve işletme çevresi (kurumsal ve faaliyetsel çevre), yolsuzlukların sınıflandırılması, yolsuzluk ve örgütün mimarisi, örgütsel davranış ve yolsuzluğa karşı örgütsel açıdan alınabilecek bazı tedbirler ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Organizational perspective of corruption: An exploratory study in the context of its concept, its nature, organizational environment, organizational behavior, and organizational architecture

Corruption is a phenomenon that it’s old as the history of government itself. In recent years, the topic of corruption has taken much attention both in Turkey and abroad. The corruption practices in many well known companies such as Enron and WorldCom has raised importance of the issue in terms of organizational perspective. According to the result of a study, corruption in organizations has increased as of 71 % in last three years and one of two organizations is corrupted by its members (Anthony, 2006). The corrupt practices generally include bribery, fraud, favoritism, extortion embezzlement, and insider trading. Although the topic of corruption has gained much importance in recent years, there are little or no studies on organizational view of corruption in management literatures as far as we know. Hence, the purpose of the present study is to elucidate the corruption phenomenon, which has been one of the most discussed topics in recent years, from organizational perspective by using model of Luo (2005). There are many definitions about corruptions in the literature because the phenomenon is complex and multiple causes. Viewed most broadly, corruption is using or abusing the public resources for private ends or interests (World Bank, BEEPS, 2006) or using public responsibility against the law (Emre, 2003: 222). From organizational perspective, corruption can be defined as “role behavior in any organizations (not just government or public service) that violates formally defined role obligations in search of private gain” (Luo, 2005: 121). According to Klitgoard (1998) corruption may be represented as following a formula: C = M + D – A. Corruption equals Monopoly plus Discretion minus Accountability. Whether the activity is public, private, or nonprofit. Luo observes seven characteristics of corruption phenomenon which are, context–based, norm-deviated, power-related, virtually covert, intentional, opportunistic, and perceptional (2005: 122-125). Some scholars suggest that a firm’s behavior and strategy are shaped by organizational (institutional and task) environment (Scott ve Meyer, 1994: 134). Hence, organizational environment may be predictor of corrupt behaviors and practices. The task environment includes oligopolistic intensity, regulatory control and structural uncertainty. On the other hand traits of institutional environment consist of institutional transparency, institutional fairness and institutional complexity (Luo, 2005: 128). According to model of Luo, traits of institutional and task environment which cited above escalates pressure for corruption and probability of corruption. But transmitting of pressure into corruption depends upon organizational moral, norms and culture (Luo, 2005: 129). Corrupt practices in organizations differ in the intensity (quantity) and hierarchical level (group, team, unit level) which is defined as the taxonomy of corrupt organizations by Luo. Using the intensity and hierarchical scales four metaphorical identities is emerged “mad fox” (high intensity and more hierarchies), “errant rabbit” (low intensity and few hierarchies), “sick bulldog” (low intensity and more hierarchies), and “wild puppy” (high intensity and few hierarchies) (Luo, 2005: 125). “Mad fox” metaphor represents an organization where many managers and employees are related to corrupt activities at many hierarchal levels or in various sub-units. In this kind of corrupt organizations, a system malfeasance exist which refers an entire organizations system is contaminated with corrupt activities (Luo, 2005: 34). The second one, “errant rabbit” stands for an organization where intensity and hierarchical scales of corruption are both low and narrower hierarchal involvement (Luo, 2005: 126). Procedural malfeasance exist in errant rabbit refers that formalized business ethics not strictly followed by some employees, resulting in a low scale illegalities. “Sick bulldog” metaphor for an origination represents the corrupt activities are not intensive but are the corruption practices of managers and employees at many different levels (Luo, 2005: 127). In this kind of corrupt organizations, structural malfeasance exists where corrupt acts are structural in nature. The last one, “wild puppy” stands for an organization where most of the corruptions is narrowly concentrated on few hierarchies (Luo, 2005: 127). Categorical malfeasance exist in these kinds of organizations, where corrupts practices in few categorical levels (team level, functional level) (Luo, 2005: 135). Consequences of corruption in organization have many negative effects. One of the most important one is that corruption influences organizational image and performance negatively. Also, strategic impediment, competitive disadvantage, organizational deficiency and mismanagement are the other consequences of corruption from organizational perspectives (Hogg and Terry, 2000; Gioia, Schultz and Corley, 2000). In order to avoid above consequences organization should shape organizational architecture effectively which control and monitor illicit behaviors and set corporate culture that prevent organization from corruptions. To fight against corruptions, organizations should take some measures by designing organizational architecture. Organizations differ in task and institutional pressures of corruptions. Hence, different metaphors require different measures in order to fight against corruptions. Misconducts and illicit behaviors can be detected through effective establishment of tasks and responsibilities individuals. Ethical training and leadership, a conduct code, and compliance system might minimize corrupt practices and behaviors. Using rewards and punishment system effectively can be other important ways of fighting against corruption in organizations (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999: 540-541). In conclusion, training and development, detection and deterrence, and designing company culture, structure and system are the main tools that managers can utilize in organizations against corruptions. As a result, by using the model which was developed by Luo, corruption and organizational environment (institutional and task environment), taxonomy of corrupt organizations, corruption and organizational behavior, corruption and organizational architecture and some organizational precautions against corruption were tried to be explained in this study. It is important to note that in future studies, what an extent organizational environment factors (institutional and task) influence corrupts practices in organization should be investigated empirically in order to support the theoretical findings presented above. Also, relation between organizational architecture, moral/ethical values and corruptions can be investigated in organizations running in different sectors by researchers that may be helpful to arrive at an understanding of the organizational architecture, moral/ethical values and corruptions.

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