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156

ŞEMSİYE ETKİSİ NEDENİYLE ZARAR GÖRENLERİN TAZMİNAT TALEPLERİNİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ REKABET HUKUKU BAKIMINDAN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ: KONE KARARININ YANSIMALARI

Rekabet ihlalleri dağıtım zincirinin farklı kademelerinde yer alan pek çok kişinin zarar görmesine neden olduklarından yaygın bir zarara sebebiyet verirler. Bu husus tüm bu zarar görenlerin tazminat almaya hakkı olup olmadığına ilişkin soruyu da beraberinde getirir. Zarar görenlerin zararlarını ispat bakımından birbirinden farklı ve bazılarının diğerlerine göre daha zor koşullara tabi olması nedeniyle bu soruya cevap vermek kolay değildir. Özellikle zarar ile rekabet ihlali arasında illiyet bağının kurulması, ihlalden zarar görme şekillerine göre mağdurların tazminat elde etmede karşılaştıkları başlıca güçlüklerden birisidir. Rekabet ihlalinin oluşturduğu şemsiye etkisi nedeniyle zarar gören alıcı grubu, tam da bu noktada zararlarını tazmin etmede zorlanmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği rekabet kuralları çerçevesinde şemsiye etkisi nedeniyle zarar gören bu grubun tazminat hakkının olup olmadığına ilişkin tartışma, çok yakın bir zamanda Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanının verdiği kararla çözüme kavuşmuş görünmektedir. Bu bakımdan çalışmamız, söz konusu kararın şemsiye etkisinden kaynaklı zararların tazmin edilmesiyle ilgili zorlukları ne ölçüde aşabildiğini tartışacak ve söz konusu etki nedeniyle zarar görenlerin tazminat alma hakkı olduğunu belirtmenin pratikte yol açabileceği olası etkiler üzerinde duracaktır
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Rekabet ihlalleri, tazminat talepleri, dava açma hakkı, illiyet bağı, şemsiye etkisi nedeniyle zarar gören alıcılar

THE ASSESSMENT OF UMBRELLA CLAIMS IN LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION RULES: REFLECTIONS ON THE KONE JUDGMENT

The fact that competition infringements cause a widespread harm gives rise to the issue that numerous persons who are at various levels of the distribution chain are affected. This poses the question whether all those harmed can be compensated for their loss. An answer to that question would not be easy when all those harmed are subject to different conditions in proving their claims and these conditions might be more difficult for some than for others. Depending on the way in which victims suffer from the infringement, showing the causal relationship between the loss and the infringement appears to be one of the obstacles to a successful damages action. This is where umbrella customers face the hardship in proving their cases to obtain compensation. The debate on whether umbrella customers have a right to damages in EU competition law seems to be settled with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Therefore, the article seeks to analyse the extent to which the judgment would overcome the difficulties in claiming umbrella damages and discuss the possible implications of granting standing to umbrella customers in practice
Keywords:

Competition law infringements, damage claims, standing to sue, the causal relationship, umbrella customers,

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Rekabet Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-552X
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 5 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2000
  • Yayıncı: Rekabet Kurumu
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ŞEMSİYE ETKİSİ NEDENİYLE ZARAR GÖRENLERİN TAZMİNAT TALEPLERİNİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ REKABET HUKUKU BAKIMINDAN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ: KONE KARARININ YANSIMALARI

Eda ŞAHİN

AKARYAKIT BAYİLİK SÖZLEŞMELERİNDE REKABET ETMEME YÜKÜMLÜLÜĞÜ

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REKABET HUKUKU İLE HAKSIZ REKABET HUKUKU İLİŞKİSİ

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