Rekabet hukuku uygulamasında bilgi değişimi

Çalışmamız neticesinde, rekabet otoritelerinin bilgi paylaşımını per se yasak olarak değerlendirmedikleri sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Uygulamada bilgi değişimi eylemi değerlendirilirken ikili bir ayrıma gidildiği görülmektedir. Bunlardan ilki bilgi değişiminin per se yasak ihlaller veya karteller için zemin hazırlayan kolaylaştırıcı eylem niteliğinde olmasıdır. Bu durumda paylaşım rekabet otoritelerince yasaklanabilecek ve ilgili teşebbüslere para cezası verilebilecektir. ikincisi ise sadece bilgi değişiminin mevcut olmasıdır. Bir başka ifade ile bilgi paylaşımının kolaylaştırıcı eylem niteliğinde olmadığı durumlar ayrıca incelenmektedir. Rekabet Otoritelerinin uygulaması ışığında, paylaşımın per se bir ihlalin kolaylaştırıcı eylemi niteliğinde olmadığı hallerde, bilgi değişiminin rule of reason analizine tabi tutulması gerektiği ifade edilebilir. Bu çerçevede fiili veya potansiyel bir rekabet ihlali olup olmadığı değerlendirilir. Analiz neticesinde ihlal sonucuna ulaşılırsa bilgi değişiminin yasaklanması veya değişime koşullu izin verilmesi söz konusu olabilecektir. Çalışmamızda detaylı bir şekilde görüleceği üzere, irtibat nedeniyle pazarda normalde mevcut bulunmayan koşullar ortaya çıkmışsa, pazar koşulları elverişliyse ve değiştirilen bilgi niteliği gereği rekabete hassas ise paylaşımın rekabeti sınırlama potansiyeline sahip olduğu rahatlıkla belirtilebilir. irtibat nedeniyle pazarda normalde mevcut bulunmayan koşulların ortaya çıkıp çıkmadığı belirlenirken, değişimin olmadığı durum ile mevcut durumun karşılaştırılması gerekir. Ayrıca yüksek derecede yoğunlaşmış oligopol pazarlarda bilgi paylaşımının rekabeti sınırlandırmaya daha elverişli olduğu ifade edilebilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler:

bilgi

Information exchange in competition law practice

In accordance with our research, we reached to the conclusion that competition authorities do not evaluate information sharing as per se illegal. It is understood that there is a dual distinction in the assessment of information exchange systems in practice. Initially, sharing of information can be in the form of a facilitating practice which enables to carry out a per se illegal infringement and/ or a cartel. In a situation like this, the exchange may be banned and administrative fines may be given to the participating undertakings by the competition authorities. Secondly, the action which is considered as illegal may only be information sharing on it’s own. That is to say, an information exchange behavior which is not considered as a facilitating practice would be evaluated differently. Within the framework of competition authorities practice, it can be mentioned that information exchanges which are not in the context of facilitating practices, should be analyzed by rule of reason doctrine. Actual or potential competition infringements would be assessed in this context. As the details will be seen in our study, market conditions should be observed to determine whether an information exchange distorts competition or not. If other adverse conditions regarding competition arose other than the normal conditions in the market, than the exchange may be determined as an infringement. Besides, information sharing in a highly concentrated oligopolistic market is more likely to restrict competition. Finally, if the market conditions are available and the information has a commercialy sensitive nature it can be easily emphasized that information sharing has a potential to restrict competition.
Keywords:

information,

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  • Rekabet Kurulu'nun 08-23/237-75 sayılı, 10.03.2008 tarihli kararı.
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