ÇEVRESEL DÜZENLEMELERİN REKABET ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ

Bilindiği gibi çevresel düzenlemelerin özellikle son yıllarda tüm dünyada önemi gittikçe artmıştır ve önümüzdeki süreçte anılan düzenlemelerin gündemde daha çok yer alması beklenmektedir. Bununla birlikte bu düzenlemelerin bazı uygulamalarının pazardaki rekabetçi yapıyı bozabileceği de görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada çevresel düzenlemeler hakkında bilgi verilerek bu düzenlemelerin rekabeti etkilediği alanlar ortaya konulmaktadır. Bu kapsamda giriş bölümünü takiben çevresel düzenlemelere genel bir bakış altında bu düzenlemelere niçin ihtiyaç duyulduğu anlatılmaktadır. Sonraki bölümde ise fayda maliyet analizine değinilerek çevresel düzenlemelerin ekonomi üzerindeki etkilerine teorik ve pratik örneklerle yer verilmektedir. Dört numaralı bölümde çevresel düzenlemelerin pazarda faaliyet gösteren teşebbüsler üzerindeki etkileri değerlendirilmektedir. Bir sonraki bölümde ise çevresel düzenlemeler ve pazara giriş engelleri batık maliyetlerin artması, pazara yeni giriş yapan şirketlere yönelik farklı uygulamalar, lisans-sertifika yükümlülüğü ve bürokrasi ve arazi kullanımı planlaması kapsamında ele alınmaktadır. Altıncı bölümde çevresel düzenleme ve rekabet politikası kapsamında sırasıyla pazar tanımı, birleşmedevralmalar, rakip maliyetlerin artırılması, gönüllü anlaşmalar, devlet yardımları ve sübvansiyonlar, tahsis ticareti incelenmiştir. Takip eden bölümde çevresel düzenlemeler, rekabet otoriteleri açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Sonuç bölümde ise çalışmanın sonunda ulaşılan sonuçlara yer verilmiştir

THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON COMPETITION

In recent years, the environmental regulations have been gaining importance in all around the world. Doubtless to say; environmental regulations are inevitable for us and for the next generations not only for a clean environment but also for a blooming world. However, while pursuing its objectives, an environmental regulation may distort competition, whereas competition is the most crucial element for market economies. This paper focuses on some sort of enviromental regulations and the interaction of those regulations with competition policy. In this regard, following the introduction, the reader can find a general overview of the environmental regulations in the second part. The third part covers information about cost and benefit analysis. The fourth section evaluates the effects of environmental regulations on existing firms. Part five examines environmental regulations and entry barriers in the context of sunk costs, vintage differentiated regulations, licensing, certification and red-tape, land use planning. The sixth part deals with an analysis of the effects of environmental regulations on competition policy with respect to market definition, mergers&acquisitions, increasing rival costs, voluntary agreements, state aids and tradable permits markets. While the seventh part is designed to provide suggestions for competition authorities to consider in this process, the final part draws the conclusions

___

  • AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW AND SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009), “Joint Comments, the Response to Questionnarie Issued By the Europen Commission in Connection with Its Review of The Current Regime For The Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements”
  • http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_horizontal_agreements/aba.
  • pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • BECKER, R. ve V. HENDERSON (2000), “Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No:2, s.379-421.
  • BILITEWSKI B, G. HARDTLE, K. MAREK, A. WEISSBACH ve
  • H. BOEDDICKER (1997), Waste Management, Springer Verlag, Berlin.
  • BESANKO, D, D. DRANOVE, M. SHANLEY ve S. SCHAEFER (2007), Economics of Strategy, Fourth Edition, John Wiley and Sons Inc. US.
  • BROCK, W. A. ve D. EVANS (1985), “The Economics of Regulatory Tiering”, RAND Journal of Economics, 16(3), s.398-409.
  • BROWN, J. (2005), “Raising Rivals Costs via California’s Environmental Regulations: An Empirical Test”, Seminar Paper Presented at University of California, Santa Barbara, www.econ.ucsb.edu/seminar/papers/f05/brown.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. BUCHANAN, J. M. ve G. TULLOCK (1975), Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, American Economic Review, 65(1), s.139-147.
  • BURTRAW, D. (2009), Next Step in Domestic Climate Policy: Issues and Innovations, Presentation at Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan Ann Arbor, March 18, 2009.
  • BUSHNELL, J.B. ve C.D. WOLFRAM (2007), The Economic Effects of Vintage Differentiated Regulations: The Case of New Source Review, University of California Energy Institute Center for the Study of Energy Markets, Paper CSEMWP-157.
  • CARLTON, D.W. ve C. LOURY (1980), The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 3, s.559-566.
  • COASE, R.H. (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, “The Journal of Law and Economics”, Vol. 3. (October 1960) s.1-44.
  • CRAIN, M. (2005), “The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms”, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • CREIGHTON, S. A. (2005), “Cheap Exclusion”, Remarks Before: Charles River Associates 9th Annual Conference Current Topics in Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy Washington, DC
  • http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/creighton/050425cheapexclusion.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. DEAN, T. ve R. BROWN (1995), “Pollution Regulation as a Barrier to New Firm Entry: Initial Evidence and Implications for Further Research,” Academy of Management Journal 38(1), s.288-303.
  • FEHR, Nils-H.M.V.D. (1993), “Tradable Emission Rights and Strategic Interaction”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 3, s.129-151.
  • FISCHER, C. ve R. NEWELL (2007), “Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation”, Resources For the Future”, DP 04-05, 2004 Revised at 2007, http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-04-05-REV.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. FOWLIE, M. (2007), Emissions Trading, Electricity Industry Restructuring and Investment in Pollution Abatement
  • http://sitemaker.umich.edu/fowlie/files/jmp.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • FOWLIE, M. (2008a), Lecture Notes: Public Goods and Externalities, SPP 564 Winter 2008, University of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy.
  • FOWLIE, M. (2008b), CAT 09 PPT, SPP 564 Winter 2008, University of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy, Ders notları.
  • FOWLIE, M, S. P. HOLLAND ve E.T. MANSUR (2009), “What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence From Southern California's Nox Trading Program”, NBER Working Paper No: 15082
  • http://www.nber.org/papers/w15082.pdf , Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • FULLERTON, D. ve R. STAVINS (1998), “How Economists See the Environment”, Nature, Vol: 395, No: 6701.
  • GOLDBERG, P. (1998), “The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards in the US”, Journal of Industrial Economics, (47), s.1-33.
  • GREENSTONE, M. (2001), “The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and The Census of Manufactures”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 8484
  • http://www.nber.org/papers/w8484.pdf?new_window=1
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. GOULDER, L.H. (2009), “Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade”, Stanford University, Resources for the Future and NBER, Lecture Readings: Public Goods and Externalities, SPP 564 Winter 2008, University of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy.
  • JOSKOW, P.L. (2001), “California’s Electric Crisis, NBER Working Paper Series”, Working Paper 8442, http://www.nber.org/papers/w8442.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. HAHN, R. (1999), “The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy”, AEI- Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 99-4, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=167028
  • Erişim Tarihi: Temmuz 2009. HELLAND, E. ve M. MATSUNO (2003), “Pollution Abatement as a Barrier to Entry”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 24(2), s.243-259.
  • KLING, C. L. ve J. ZHAO (1999), “On the Long-Run Efficiency of Auctioned vs. Free Permits”, Iowa State University webpapers
  • http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/NDN0015.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. LEONE, R A. ve J.E. JACKSON (1981), “The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity: the Case of Water-pollution Controls.” Gary Fromm, (der.), Studies in Public Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Pres içinde s. 231-271, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11433.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • LIPSEY, R. ve A. CHRYSTAL (2006), Economics, Oxford University Press Eleventh Edition, Oxford New York.
  • MALONEY, M.T. ve G.L. BRADY (1988), “Capital Turnover and Marketable Pollution Rights”, Journal of Law and Economics, 31(1), s.203-226.
  • MALONEY, M.T. ve R.E. McCORMICK (1982), “A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation”, Journal of Law and Economics, 25(1), s.98-120.
  • MANSUR, E.T. (2007), “Prices vs. Quantities: Environmental Regulation and Imperfect Competition”, Nber Working Paper Series, Working Paper 13510, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13510, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • NELSON, R.A, T. TIETENBERG ve M. R. DONIHUE (1993), “Differential Environmental Regulation: Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions”, The Review of Economics And Statistics, 75 (2), s.368-373.
  • OECD (2006), Policy Roundtable on Environmental Regulation and Competition, OECD, Paris.
  • OECD (2007), “Environmental Regulation and Competition”, Journal of Competition Law and Policy, Vol:9 No:2, Paris.
  • PASHIGIAN, P. (1984), “The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares”, Journal of Law and Economics, 27(1), s.1-28.
  • PIZER, A., W.R. MORGENSTERN ve J.S. SHIH (2008), “Evaluating Voluntary Climate Programs in the United States”, Resources for The Future Discussion Paper, 08-13, http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08- 13.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • PORTER, M.E. (1998), Competitive Strategy, The Free Pres, New York.
  • REKABET KURUMU (2009), Rekabet Terimleri Sözlüğü, Ankara, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/images/file/Ekonomi/1_BASKI%20REKAB ET_TERIMLERI.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • SANKAR, U. (2006), Environmental Externalities, Madras School of Economics, http://coe.mse.ac.in/dp/envt-ext-sankar.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Temmuz 2009.
  • SHADBEGIAN, R.J., W.B. GRAY ve C.L. MORGAN (2005), “Benefits and Costs from Sulfur Dioxide Trading: A Distributional Analysis”, National Center for Environmental Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper 05-09, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/44a8be610f6c5f0885256e46007b104e/ae 68803ec775df65852571a8007245d7/$FILE/2005-09.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. SHERMAN, R. (2008), “Market Regulation”, First Edition, The Addision- Wesley Series, Boston, MA, US.
  • STAVINS, R. N. (2005), “The Effects of Vintage-differentiated Environmental Regulation”, Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 05-12
  • http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=691342
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. T.C.
  • Kalkınma Planı Çevre Özel İhtisas Raporu, Ankara, Türkiye. DEVLET PLANLAMA TEŞKİLATI (2007)
  • TEWARI, D.D. ve K. SINGH (2003), Principles of Microeconomics, New Age International Limited Publishers, New Delhi.
  • UK GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC SERVICE (2006), “The Stern Report on Economics of Climate Change”
  • http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. US BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (1994), “The Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures Survey”
  • http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/wpi.nsf/7e8e12c2a0e34c0585256c2c00577d69/c
  • f35f2d42c7b08c1852566b7006e7f20/$FILE/ma-200x94.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. US FTC and US DOJ (2006), “Roundtable On Environmental Regulation And Competition, Note By The US FTC and The US” DOJ, Paris
  • http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/competition_environment_roundtable
  • submission.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.
  • VEDDER, H.B. (2000), “Voluntary Agreements and Competition Law”, Nota Di Lavoro 79.2000, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
  • http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/FC5A9109-6763-4D72-B01E
  • C97874999/672/7900.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Temmuz 2009. VIDERAS, J. (2005), “Voluntary Environmental Programs as a Collusive Mechanism: Incentives, Design and Welfare Effects, Department of Economics”, Hamilton College, Working Paper 02/05
  • http://academics.hamilton.edu/economics/home/Workpap/02_05.pdf
  • Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009. VISCUSI W.K, J.E. JR HARRINGTON ve J.VERNON (2005), Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Fourth Edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, US.
  • WELDFORD, R. ve A. GOULDSON (1993), Environmental Management and Business Strategy, First Addition, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, London, Great Britain.
  • WOERDMAN, E. (2001), “Developing a European Carbon Trading Market: Will Permit Allocation Distort Competition and Lead to State Aid? Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Evaluation”, Working Paper 51/2001, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Milan, Italy
  • http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/B3C7A730-442B-4907-9DE4
  • F538EF7C6/354/5101.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: Ağustos 2009.