Erdem AKTEKİN

11421

Avrupa Birliği Rekabet Hukukunda Çift Taraflı Pazarlarda İlgili Ürün Pazarının Tanımlanması

Avrupa Birliği AB Rekabet Hukuku uygulamasında ilgili ürün pazarının tanımlanması süreci, özellikle AB’nin İşleyişi Hakkında Antlaşma’nın 102. maddesi ve 139/2004 sayılı Teşebbüsler Arası Yoğunlaşmaların Kontrolüne İlişkin Konsey Tüzüğü kapsamında yapılacak incelemeler açısından kilit bir role sahiptir. Bu tip incelemeler açısından ilgili ürün pazarının belirlenmesi, rekabetçi analizin yapılacağı çerçeveyi çizmekte ve ekonomik analizin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenledir ki, ilgili ürün pazarının tanımlanması süreci; titizlikle uygulanacak, incelemeye konu ürünlere ve bu ürünlerin yer aldığı pazarın dinamiklerine bağlı esnek bir forma ihtiyaç duymaktadır.AB Rekabet Hukuku uygulamasının geçmiş son on yılı göstermiştir ki, teknolojik gelişime bağlı olarak sayıları artan “yeni ekonomi” pazarları ile birlikte kapsamı daha da genişleyen “çift-taraflı ürün”leri konu alan incelemeler kapsamında gerçekleştirilecek ilgili ürün pazarı tanımlamalarında; alışılagelmiş araçların kullanımı hatalı sonuçlar doğurabilmektedir. Bu pazarlarda gözlemlenen birbirine bağlı talep fonksiyonları, farklı fiyat-maliyet ilişkileri gibi ekonomik karakteristiklerinin analize doğru bir biçimde yansıtılması gerekmektedir.Bu kapsamda, çalışmanın amacını, çift taraflı ürünler açısından, ilgili ürün pazarının tanımlanmasında kullanılan kavramsal ve ekonomik araçların uygulanabilirliğinin test edilmesi ve ortaya çıkan sonuçlar doğrultusunda yapılması gereken uyarlamaların tespit edilmesi oluşturmaktadır. Pratikte dikkat edilmesi gereken ilk husus, geleneksel pazarlarda kullanılan yöntemlerin, ancak bu yöntemlerin dayandıkları varsayımların ele alınan çift taraflı pazar açısından geçerli olduğunun dikkatli bir şekilde tespit edilmesinden sonra uygulanmalarıdır. Aksi halde tek taraflı pazarlar için geliştirilen bu yaklaşımlar, reklam destekli medya pazarlarına ilişkin analizlerde görülebildiği üzere, pazarın bir tarafının diğer tarafı üzerindeki etkilerinin gözden kaçırılmasına ve analizin eksik kalmasına neden olabilmektedir
Anahtar Kelimeler:

AB Rekabet Hukuku, çift taraflı pazarlar, ilgili ürün pazarının tanımlanması, dolaylı ağ etkileri, platform endüstrileri

Relevant Product Market Definition In Two- Sided Markets Under EU Competition Law

Market delineation process and market definition is at the core of application of EU Competition Law, especially when it comes to the cases dealing with Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Council Regulation EC No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. Defining markets help practitioners set the stage by narrowing down the analysis on a set of products and economic interactions. The task has to be done in precision because boundaries of the market define the area where the competitive effects are assessed. However, caution must be taken when the process involves products in two-sided markets as these may pose a threat to the integrity of this process if unique characteristics of these markets such as interlinked demands and price-cost interactions are left unconsidered. In this respect, the aim of this article is to assess to what extent the conceptual and economical tools which are readily applied are applicable to two-sided products and to identify the required modifications needed. As a rule of thumb, existing modes of analysis shall not be applied to two-sided markets without carefully assessing whether the underlying assumptions are applicable. Otherwise, one-sided approach could exclude one side of the market out of consideration, a common issue mostly encountered in cases with advertisement-supported media, leaving the assessment short of analysis of competitive effects of one side or the effects that one side has over the demand of the other side
Keywords:

Two-sided markets, market definition, EU Competition Law, indirect network effects, platform markets,

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Rekabet Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-552X
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 5 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2000
  • Yayıncı: Rekabet Kurumu
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