In a final settlement of the Cyprus problem, Turkish Cypriots would no doubt request guarantees and safeguards in the constitution that would ensure an equal voice in the government. When one looks at the 1960 Constitution, the mechanism provided therein will be described as ‘functional federation’. In fact, the 1960 Constitution and the Zurich and London Agreements created a state of affairs not only between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, but also between the two motherlands, Greece and Turkey. The Constitution was for a Greek President elected only by the Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Vice-president elected only by the Turkish Cypriots , a Council of Ministers with three Turkish and seven Greek ministers the Turkish side appointing, among others, the Minister of Foreign Affairs & Defence , and a House of Representatives, public administration and security forces formed on a 40-60 ratio between the two communities. Also, each community had its own Communal Chamber and, in the five biggest towns, the Turkish Cypriots had separate municipalities. These checks and balances in the Constitution and in the Treaties establishing an independent Republic of Cyprus were based on the premise that this delicate balance or equilibrium, if you will, should not be tilted in favour of one or the other side in its international relations, especially through memberships of international organisations. The drafters of the Constitution realised that if the Republic of Cyprus joined an international organisation in which only Greece or Turkey was a member, the carefully drafted balance between the two communities, all the provisions specifically built into the Constitution for the protection of the Turkish community, would change in favour of the other side.