Given the failure of two major schools of thought in International Relations, namely realism and liberalism, in explaining the schisms among transatlantic partners, it has become fashionable to explain the intraEuropean divide regarding transatlantic security by analysing the differences in the “strategic cultures” of the EU member states and the US. In this regard Robert Kagan’s provocative comparison of a more pacific European strategic culture to that of the USA, has been undermined by the considerable heterogeneity and complexity of Europeans’ attitudes regarding transatlantic security. The objective of this article is to discuss strategic culture arguments in explaining the differences between the transatlantic security approaches of the so-called old and new Europeans. To illustrate the differences in Europeans towards transatlantic security, two major old European states, Germany and France, and some of the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe are taken into consideration for the analysis. Here it is argued that there were different dynamics at work in different European countries, thus, in spite of its merits, strategic culture as a conceptual framework also has limitations in explaining the whole picture regarding the different European approaches to transatlantic security