STATÜKODAN SAPMANIN MALİYETLİ OLDUĞU KAMU MALI OYUNLARI
Guney ve Richter’in (2016), kişinin statükodan başka bir alternatif seçmesinin kişiye maliyetli olabileceğini öneren seçim davranışını kamu malı oyunlarına uygulamaktayız. Bir statüko katkı düzeyi varlığında, kamu malına sıfırdan farklı bir katkı yapmanın optimal olabileceğini göstermekteyiz. Ayrıca göstermekteyiz ki, eğer sapma maliyeti statüko dışında kalan alternatiflere bağlı olmayıp sadece statükoya bağlı olursa, kişinin kamu malına statüko veya sıfır dışında kalan ara değerlerde katkı yapması optimal olmaz.
PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH COSTLY SWITCHING FROM A STATUS QUO
We apply Guney and Richter’s (2016) choice model of costly switching from a status quo to publicgoods games. We find that non-zero contribution into the public good can be optimal under a status quocontribution level. Moreover, intermediate contribution levels are no longer optimal if the switching costdepends only on the status quo contribution level but not on the contribution level the agent switches to.
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