EN AZ GELIŞMIŞ ÜLKELERDE BIRINCI EN İYI YÖNETIŞIM KURUMLARININ BÜYÜME ÜZERINE ETKISI

Çalışma, özellikle birinci en iyi yönetişim kurumlarının ekonomik büyümenin ana belirleyicisi olması vurgusuyla, En Az Gelişmiş Ülkeler (EAGÜ)’ de düşük seviyeli ekonomik büyümeyi incelemektedir. Yüksek gelirli OECD ülkeleriyle karşılaştırıldığında EAGÜ birinci en iyi yönetişim kurumlarında göze çarpan olumsuz yöndeki açık, bir çok nedenden ötürü farklılaşan ekonomilerin yönetişim kurumları ve kişi başına düşen gelir seviyeleri açısından farklılık göstermeleri tartışmasını desteklemektedir. Çalışmanın katkısı, birinci en iyi yönetişim kurumlarının nasıl bir mekanizmayla ekonomik büyümeyi politik, iktisadi, idari ve demokratik kanallarla etkilediğini ortaya koyarak yeni politik büyüme iktisadındaki bu boşluğu doldurmaktır. Her ne kadar EAGÜ’in ülkelerdeki birinci en iyi yönetişim kurumlarını kendilerine adapte etmeleri sürdürülebilir ekonomik büyümeye çözüm olmasa da, EAGÜ’indeki birinci en iyi yönetişim kurumlarındaki iyileşmeler önemli ölçüde ekonomik büyümeye yol açmaktadır. Zira, yönetişim kurumlarına yapılan yatırımlar azalan verimler yasasına uyduğu için, bu yatırımların faydaları daha küçük ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler için en çoktur.

THE ROLE OF FIRST-BEST GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS ON GROWTH IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The study addresses the issue of the low level of GDP per capita growth in Least Developed Countries(LDCs), with special emphasis on the role of first-best governance institutions as a main determinant ofgrowth. LDCs can be characterized by a clear deficit in first-best governance institutions compared tohigh-income OECD countries supporting the argument that economies that are different for a varietyof reasons will differ both in their institutions and in their income per capita. The contribution of thestudy is to fill the gap in the new political economy of growth by establishing the mechanism of howfirst-best governance institutions affect growth through the political, economical, administrative anddemocratic channels. Although the adoption of first-best governance institutions of advanced countriesto LDCs is not a panacea to sustainable economic growth, improvement of first-best governanceinstitutions in LDCs significantly induce growth, since investments in governance institutions aresubject to diminishing returns, so that the benefits are most pronounced for smaller and developingeconomies.

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