Açık Artırma Teorisi Üzerine Bir Çalışma

Bu çalışmada ihaleler üzerine teorik bir araştırma yapılacaktır. Belirli varsayımlar altında model kurulduktan sonra açık artırma çeşitleri incelenecektir. İkisi sözlü ikisi kapalı zarf ihalesi olmak üzere dört standart ihale bilinmektedir. Bunlardan sözlü olan İngiliz ve Flemenk ihaleleri ve kapalı zarf ihalesi olan birinci fiyat kapalı zarf ihalesi pratikte kullanılan, ikinci fiyat kapalı zarf ihalesi ise teorik anlamı olan açık artırmalardır. Bu çalışmada her bir ihale için denge araştırılacak, ve örnekler verilecektir

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Açık Artırma, Teklif, Denge, Kapalı-Zarf, Denge Gelir Teoremi

In this paper I will analyze theoretical work on auctions. After giving some assumptions and the model I will analyze the types of auctions in theory. There two oral auctions and two sealed-bid auctions. Both type of oral auctions, English and Dutch, and first-price sealed-bid auctions are used in practice but the second-price sealed-bid auctions are used in theory. In this study, I will examine the equilibrium of all these types of auctions and give some examples where these auctions are used.

Keywords:

Auction, Bid, Equilibrium, Sealed-Bid, Revenue Equivalance Theorem,

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