On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection Required for Moral Responsibility
Derivative moral responsibility is not moral responsibility at all. Much of the confusion found in the literature concerning moral responsibility and the free will problem can be traced back to a penchant to reconcile our philosophical theories of moral responsibility with our folk commonsense linguistic accounts of moral responsibility, a tradition that is notable for its utter lack of making two important distinctions - (1) the distinction between derivative moral responsibility and non-derivative moral responsibility (what Galen Strawson calls “true moral responsibility”) and (2) the distinction between the scope and degree of one’s moral responsibility.1 The failure to make such distinctions, ultimately, leads to confusion in interpreting the content of folk intuitions about moral responsibility, and as a result leads many philosophers to adopt watered down, or overly complex theories of moral responsibility. In “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Carl Ginet fails to make such distinctions, and as a result the requirement he arrives at is unwieldy at best. By making such distinctions, I will provide a much more straightforward account of what moral responsibility requires.
Anahtar Kelimeler:
Commonsense Ethics, Derivative Moral Responsibility, Free Will, Moral Responsibility
On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection Required for Moral Responsibility
Derivative moral responsibility is not moral responsibility at all. Much of the confusion found in the literature concerning moral responsibility and the free will problem can be traced back to a penchant to reconcile our philosophical theories of moral responsibility with our folk commonsense linguistic accounts of moral responsibility, a tradition that is notable for its utter lack of making two important distinctions - (1) the distinction between derivative moral responsibility and non-derivative moral responsibility (what Galen Strawson calls “true moral responsibility”) and (2) the distinction between the scope and degree of one’s moral responsibility.1 The failure to make such distinctions, ultimately, leads to confusion in interpreting the content of folk intuitions about moral responsibility, and as a result leads many philosophers to adopt watered down, or overly complex theories of moral responsibility. In “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Carl Ginet fails to make such distinctions, and as a result the requirement he arrives at is unwieldy at best. By making such distinctions, I will provide a much more straightforward account of what moral responsibility requires.
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- Aristotle, 2001, Nicomachean Ethics in The Basic Works of Aristotle ed. Richard McKeon. Randomhouse
- Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23, pp. 829-839.
- Ginet, Carl, 2000, “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” Nous, Vol. 34, Supplement Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, pp. 267-277.
- Kane, Robert, 1985, Free Will and Values. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kane, Robert, 1996, The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Otsuka, Michael, 1998, “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame”, Ethics, Vol. 108, No. 4: 685-701.
- Pereboom, Derek, 2005, “Defending Hard Incompatibilism,” Midwest Studies 29, pp. 228-47.
- Smith, Holly, 1983, “Culpable Ignorance”, The Philosophical Review 97, pp. 543–571.
- Strawson, Galen, 1994, “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75, pp. 5-24.
- Widerker, David, 1995, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” The Philosophical Review 104 , pp. 247-261.
- Simkulet, William, 2015, “On Robust Alternate Possibilities and the Tax Evasion Case,” Southwest Philosophy Review, 31-1, 101-107.
- Zimmerman, Michael J., 2002, “Taking Luck Seriously”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 99, No. 11: 553-576.
- Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 2 Sayı
- Başlangıç: 2014
- Yayıncı: Eray Yağanak
Sayıdaki Diğer Makaleler
On Derivative Moral Responsibility and the Epistemic Connection Required for Moral Responsibility
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