Temsilin Zemini: Benzerlik ve Nedensellik

Öz Çağdaş literatüre göre, felsefe tarihinde iki ayrı temsil kuramı mevcuttur: i) Benzerlikçi Temsil Kuramı ve (ii) Nedenselci Temsil Kuramı. İlk bölümde ve ikinci bölümde, çağdaş literatürde ele alınan şekliyle ikinci kuramın ilk kuramı nasıl altüst ettiğini aktarmaya çalışacağım. Üçüncü bölümde ise, literatürdeki yaygın kanının aksine Nedenselci Kuram’ın Benzerlikçi Kuram’a yönelttiği eleştirilerdeki zayıflıklara ve yer yer hatalara işaret edeceğim. Benim görüşüme göre, Benzerlikçi Kuram eksik olabilir, hatta bir çok açıdan hatalı yanları da olabilir; fakat Nedenselcilerin Benzerlikçilere yönelttiği eleştiri okları ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alındığında aslında hiç bir okun hedefi vuramadığı görülecektir.

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