Devrimci Güdüler: Devrimin İktisadi Teorisi

İnsanlık tarihinin önemli dönüm noktaları olan devrimler sosyal bilimlerin de önemli bir araştırma alanını oluşturmaktadır. Bu makalede, devrimleri ortaya çıkaran güdüleri analiz eden yaklaşımlar özetlenmiş, bunlardan modern iktisadın temel yaklaşımı olan metodolojik bireycilik yöntemiyle tahlil eden çalışmalara odaklanılmıştır. Bu çerçevede, yanıt bulunması gereken en önemli sorunun rasyonel ve kendi çıkarını düşünen bireyin devrimci olmaya nasıl kalkıştığı olduğu görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Devrim, metodolojik bireyselcilik, rasyonalite

INCENTIVES TO REVOLT: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF REVOLUTION

Revolutions, which constitute turning points in the human history, has long been a subject matter of social sciences. In this article, we review the approaches that analyse the incentives that bring about revolutions. While doing this, we focus on the works that uses the basic method of the modern economics, methodological individualism. In this contex, it is revealed that the most important question is on what conditions a rational, self-interest seeking individual chooses to become a revolutionary,

Keywords:

Revolution, methodologic individualism, rationality,

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