John E. ANDERSON

6210

Informal Payments to the Tax Collector in Transition Countries

In this paper, I empirically examine survey data on the likelihood and frequency of firms’ having to make informal payments or gifts to government officials in transition countries. The firm-level survey data are from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, including Turkey. Characteristics of firms are used as explanatory variables along with country characteristics to control for the stage of economic development and current economic conditions at the time the survey data were collected. Probit and selection models of tax inspections, tax-compliance efforts, and firms' informal payments are estimated. The empirical evidence indicates that several specific corporate characteristics influence the likelihood of tax inspections, including employment and the location of the company. Both corporate and country characteristics determine the likelihood of tax officials' requests for informal payments. Importantly, tax-compliance costs significantly affect informal payments.
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Tax collection, informal payments, gifts, bribes, corruption, transition economy

Informal Payments to the Tax Collector in Transition Countries

In this paper, I empirically examine survey data on the likelihood and frequency of firms’ having to make informal payments or gifts to government officials in transition countries. The firm-level survey data are from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, including Turkey. Characteristics of firms are used as explanatory variables along with country characteristics to control for the stage of economic development and current economic conditions at the time the survey data were collected. Probit and selection models of tax inspections, tax-compliance efforts, and firms' informal payments are estimated. The empirical evidence indicates that several specific corporate characteristics influence the likelihood of tax inspections, including employment and the location of the company. Both corporate and country characteristics determine the likelihood of tax officials' requests for informal payments. Importantly, tax-compliance costs significantly affect informal payments.
Keywords:

Tax collection, informal payments, gifts, bribes, corruption, transition economy,

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Ekonomi-tek-Cover
  • ISSN: 2146-6173
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2012
  • Yayıncı: Türkiye Ekonomi Kurumu Vakfı
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