Wen-yao Grace WANG, Paula HERNANDEZ-VERME, Raymond A. K. COX

5617

Financial Fragility, Exchange-Rate Regimes, and Sudden Stops in a Small Open Economy

We model a typical Asian economy in crisis using a dynamic general equilibrium technique and establishing exchange rates from nontrivial fiat currency demands. Sudden stops/bank panics are possible and are essential for evaluating the merits of alternative exchange-rate regimes. Strategic complementarities contribute to the severe indeterminacy of a continuum of equilibria. Social welfare and the scope of equilibria are also associated with the underlying policy regime and the built-in Sequential Checking Mechanism, including liquidity, solvency, and incentive-compatibility constraints in the model. Combining domestic and foreign reserve requirements promotes stability under a floating exchange-rate regime; however, this increases the scope for panic equilibria under both floating and fixed regimes. While backing the money supply reduces financial fragility under both systems, it only acts as a stabilizer in a fixed regime.
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Sudden stops, exchange-rate regimes, multiple reserve requirements

Financial Fragility, Exchange-Rate Regimes, and Sudden Stops in a Small Open Economy

We model a typical Asian economy in crisis using a dynamic general equilibrium technique and establishing exchange rates from nontrivial fiat currency demands. Sudden stops/bank panics are possible and are essential for evaluating the merits of alternative exchange-rate regimes. Strategic complementarities contribute to the severe indeterminacy of a continuum of equilibria. Social welfare and the scope of equilibria are also associated with the underlying policy regime and the built-in Sequential Checking Mechanism, including liquidity, solvency, and incentive-compatibility constraints in the model. Combining domestic and foreign reserve requirements promotes stability under a floating exchange-rate regime; however, this increases the scope for panic equilibria under both floating and fixed regimes. While backing the money supply reduces financial fragility under both systems, it only acts as a stabilizer in a fixed regime.
Keywords:

Sudden stops, exchange-rate regimes, multiple reserve requirements,

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Ekonomi-tek-Cover
  • ISSN: 2146-6173
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2012
  • Yayıncı: Türkiye Ekonomi Kurumu Vakfı
Arşiv
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