BEKLENTİ TEORİSİ VE VERGİ UYUMUNU ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER

Beklenti teorisi, bireylerin kararlarında psikolojik etkenlerin de etkili olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Beklenti teorisi perspektifi ile gerçekleştirilen ampirik çalışmalarda vergi uyumunu etkileyen ekonomik ve mali faktörlerin yanında ekonomi dışı faktörlerin etkili olduğu gösterilmektedir. Mükelleflerin vergiye karşı tutum ve davranışlarında psikolojinin de önemli olduğunu gösteren çok sayıda davranışsal maliye çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışmada Beklenti teorisi kapsamında vergi uyumunu etkileyen faktörlerin belirlenmesi amaçlanmıştır. 817 katılımcıdan anket ile elde edilen veriler Tobit regresyon modeli ile analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmadan elde edilen bulgular, beklenti teorisinin varsayımlarının vergi uyumunda etkili olduğunu ve kayıptan kaçınma oranı yüksek olan bireylerin, düşük olanlara göre daha az vergi ödemek istediklerini göstermektedir.

PROSPECT THEORY AND FACTORS AFFECTING TAX COMPLIANCE

Prospect theory claims that psychological factors are also effective in individuals' decisions. Empirical studies conducted with the perspective of prospect theory show that besides the economic and financial factors that affect tax compliance, non-economic factors are also effective. Numerous behavioral finance studies have been conducted showing that psychology is also important in taxpayers' attitudes and behaviors towards taxes. In this study, it is aimed to determine the factors affecting tax compliance within the scope of prospect theory. The data obtained by questionnaire from 817 participants were analyzed with the Tobit regression model. The findings obtained from the study show that the assumptions of the prospect theory are effective in tax compliance and individuals with high loss aversion rate are willing to pay less tax than those with low.

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