ASİMETRİK ENFORMASYON ALTINDAKİ DÜOPOLİSTİK PİYASA YAPILARINDA KİRLİLİĞİN KONTROLÜ: OPTİMAL VERGİLENDİRME/SÜBVANSİYON VE TİCARİ YAPILABİLİR EMİSYON IZİNLERİ

Bu çalışma asimetrik enformasyon altında kirliliğe neden olan Cournot düopol piyasalarındaki firmaların optimal vergilendirme/sübvansiyon ve ticareti yapılabilir izinleri kullanılarak düzenlenmeleri ile ilgilidir. Kirlilik oluşturan firmaların talep ve maliyet fonksiyonları, kirliliği azaltmak için kullandıkları teknolojiler ve diğer ilgili ekonomik değişkenler hakkında karar alıcıdan daha fazla enformasyona sahip olmaları kirliliğin etkin bir şekilde kontrol edilmesine engel olmaktadır. Yasal düzenleyici ters seçimden kaynaklanan bu soruna rağmen üretimi düşürmeden kirliliği azaltmak için firmaları gönüllü bir şekilde teşvik edecek olan bir mekanizma geliştirmek zorundadır. Pigocu vergiler ile emisyon izinlerinin komuta ve kontrol araçlarına göre daha etkin olmalarına rağmen birbirlerine karşı bir üstünlükleri bulunmamaktadır. Ayrıca bu iki düzenleme aracının genel olarak piyasada sosyal optimumu sağlayacağı konusunda görüş birliği yoktur

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Ters Seçim, Kirlilik, Cournot Düopol

ASİMETRİK ENFORMASYON ALTINDAKİ DÜOPOLİSTİK PİYASA YAPILARINDA KİRLİLİĞİN KONTROLÜ: OPTİMAL VERGİLENDİRME/SÜBVANSİYON VE TİCARİ YAPILABİLİR EMİSYON IZİNLERİ

This paper is about regulating the firms of Cournot-düopol markets that creates pollution under asymmetric information. Optimal tax/subsidy and tradable emission permits can be used as tools for regulating the firms in these markets. The firms’ cost and demand functions, types of abatement technologies they use and their more knowledge of other relevant economic variables than those of the regulatory hinder to control the pollution affectively. Despite the fact that this problem is due to adverse selection, regulatory must develop a mechanism that will motivate firms to reduce pollution voluntarily without reducing the output. Although Pigouvian tax and emission permits are more effective in comparison to command and control tools, they are not advantageous to each other. Also, there is no consensus that these two tools will achieve social optimum in markets

Keywords:

Adverse Selection, Pollution, Cournot Duopoly,

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