Bu makalede Peter Railton (1988)’un “Olasılık Açıklamalarına dair Dedüktif-Nomolojik Model’ine odaklanacağım. İlk olarak makalenin ilerleyen tartışmaları için gerekli olan, modele dair önemli kısımları ortaya koyacağım. Buna müteakip, modelin en orijinal ve kritik parçası olan parantez eklentisi kavrayışına dair itiraz ve eleştirilerden bahsedeceğim. Eklentinin açıklanaDört Öge-Yıl 5-Sayı 10-Ekim 2016
In this paper, I will focus on Peter Railton (1988)’s “Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation”. First, I will initiate briefly the core of the model by means of explaining the important parts that are related to the preceding discussion of the paper. Following that, I will raise objections and criticisms to the notion of parenthetic addendum, which is the most genuine and crucial component of this model of explanation. I will claim that the addendum does not explain the causal origin of the explanandum; it brings circularity to the model and it excludes the D-N inference, when it plays the function of intermediation of two explanations. Finally, it brings the problem of epistemic relativization. In the second part, I will introduce two counterexamples to the model. The first one will show that in cases of intervening causes, explanations in this model fail to be explanatorily relevant. The second one will attack to the notion of ideal D-N-P text by claiming that it fails to contain all the necessary items of explanation in cases of instabilities. Ultimately, all these objections and criticisms will show that Railton’s model faces many problems which makes it difficult to be considered as being a powerful model of singular propensity explanations
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