Dynamic Management of Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts

Profesyonel portföy yönetim hizmetinin bedeli fon özelliklerinin yanı sıra, fon cinsine, fon yöneticisinin direkt portföy ilişkili ve kurum yönetimi ilişkili kararlarına ve portföyün performansına bağlıdır. Çalışmada 125 farklı kurum torafindan yönetilen 176 hisse senedi fonu incelenmektedir. Fon yönetimi Pazar hizmet fiyatı ortalamasını veri almakta ancak bu strateji ancak trend azalan karakterde olduğu durumlarda fon hissedarlarının lehine işlemektedir. Fon yöneticileri hizmetlerinin masrafinı türev araçlarını kullanarak azaltabilmekte ya da "soft dollar" anlaşmalarına girerek manipule etmektedir. Fon yönetim bedeli zorunlu olmayan kesinti aflarını ve bağımsız yöneticilerin masraflarının fon hissedarlarinca tam olarak karşılanmadığı dönemlerden sonra artış göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

yatırım

Yatırım Fonu Anlaşmalarının Dinamik Yönetimi

The price of professional portfolio management provided by the mutual fund adviser depends not only on the fund characteristics but also on the fund objective, the adviser's portfolio related and management based decisions, and the portfolio performance. I analyze the advisory fee, using a survivorship bias free data set of 176 equity funds managed by 125 different advisers. Advisers benchmark the objective average but this benefit the shareholders only when the objective trend is descending. Advisers tend to reduce the cost of their marginal product through the use of derivatives or manipulate by engaging in soft dollar agreements. I find that the advisers actively manage the advisory fee contracts responding to the outcome of their management decisions. The advisory fee increases after voluntary fee reimbursement or if the adviser is not fully reimbursed for the compensation of independent directors and officers.

Keywords:

investment,

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