A STATIC PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF IMMIGRATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Bu makalede, statik olasılıklı bir model kullanılarak ekonomik entegrasyon ve illegal göç arasındaki muhtemel ilişki incelenmiştir. Levy 1997 modelinin ana hatları kullanılarak emek yoğun bir ülkeden sermaye yoğun bir ülkeye olan göçün bu iki ülke arasında ekonomik entegrasyona yol açabileceği gösterilmiştir. Modelde göç hareketi, göçmen alan sermaye yoğun ülkedeki medyan seçmenin fayda düzeyini azaltarak, bu ülkedeki seçmenlerin, göçmen gönderen emek yoğun ülkeden gelebilecek daha fazla göçü engelleyecek bir serbest ticaret anlaşmasını desteklemelerine yol açmaktadır

STATİK OLASILIKLI GÖÇ VE EKONOMİK ENTEGRASYON MODELİ

In this paper, by using a probabilistic static model, a possible relationship between the desirability of economic integration and illegal immigration is studied. Using the framework developed in Levy 1997 , it is shown that migration from a labour abundant country to a capital abundant country might lead to economic integration between the two countries. By reducing the median voter's utility in the capital abundant host country, migration induces voters in this country to support a free trade agreement with the labour abundant migrant sending country that will stop further immigration.

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