Ahmet Burak ÇETİN

4749

İktisadi ve Politik Kurumların Ekonomik Büyüme Üzerindeki Etkisi: Gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Yükselen Piyasa Ekonomileri Karşılaştırması

Neden çok az ülke ekonomik büyümeyi sağlayan kurumları oluşturabilmektedir? Bu soruyu yanıtlamak için birbirleriyle etkileşime giren ekonomik oyuncular arasında davranış kalıpları oluşturan kurumsal unsurların incelenmesine ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Kurumlar ülkelerin ekonomik büyümesini etkileyerek mevcut etkileşimlerin hacmini ve ekonomik değişimin faydalarını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. İktisadi ve politik kurumlar ekonomik aktörlerin toplumdaki teşviklerini şekillendirdiği ve teknoloji ile fiziksel ve beşeri sermayeye yapılan yatırımları etkilediği için ekonomik büyümeye destek olmaktadır. Çalışma kapsamında Yeni Kurumsal İktisat yaklaşımının metodolojik temellerinin uygulanması suretiyle ekonomik performansın belirleyicileri olarak kabul edilen iktisadi ve politik kurumların ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkilerine dair analizler toplam 26 ülke için 2002-2016 yıllarını kapsayan verilerle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın temel ölçüm hedefi olan iktisadi ve politik kurumların ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkisi Gelişmiş Ülkeler ile Yükselen Piyasa Ekonomileri ayrımına gidilerek iki ayrı model kapsamında Panel veri analiziyle Uygulanabilir Genelleştirilmiş EKK (FGLS) tahmincisi kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında iktisadi kurumların ölçümü amacıyla kullanılan Heritage Vakfı Ekonomik Özgürlük Endeksini oluşturan göstergelerin ve politik kurumların ölçümü amacıyla kullanılan Dünya Yönetişim Endeksini oluşturan göstergelerin Gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Yükselen Piyasa Ekonomileri için ekonomik büyüme ile pozitif ilişki içerisinde ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlı olduğu saptanmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Kurumsal İktisat, İktisadi Kurumlar, Politik Kurumlar, Ekonomik Büyüme, Panel Veri Analizi

The Effect of Economic and Political Institutions on Economic Growth: The Case of Developed Countries and Emerging Market Economies

Why so few countries able to establish economic growth institutions? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the institutional elements that create behavioral patterns among the economic agents interacting with each other. Institutions reveal the volume of existing interactions and the benefits of economic change by affecting the economic growth. Economic and political institutions support economic growth as they shape the incentives of economic actors in society and affect investments in technology and physical and human capital. Within the scope of the study, economic and political institutions have been accepted as determinants of economic performance by applying the methodological foundations of the New Institutional Economics approach. In this study, the effects of economic and political institutions on economic growth analyzed by using data covering the years 2002-2016. The effect of economic and political institutions on economic growth, that are the main measurement targets of the study, has been considered within the scope of two different models by distinguishing between Developed Countries and Emerging Market Economies. The effect of institutions on the economic growth examined by using the Panel data analysis and the applicable Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator. In this study, Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index used for the measurement of economic institutions and World Governance Index used for the measurement of political institutions. The results of the analyzes indicate that economic and political institutions are positively related and statistically significant for the Developed Countries and Emerging Market Economies’ economic growth.
Keywords:

Institutional Economics, Economic Institutions, Political Institutions, Economic Growth, Panel Data Analysis,

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Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis-Cover
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 2 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2016
  • Yayıncı: Mehmet SONGUR
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