Spinoza’nın Duygu Teorisine Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım: Duygular, İnançlar ve İnsanın Özgürlüğü

Duygular arzu ve inanç ikili ayağı üzerinde varolan yönelimsel mental du rumlardır. Spinoza’nın idea kuramının bir tür inanç kuramı olduğu iddiası bir çok filozof tarafından savunulmuştur fakat Spinoza’nın genel idea kuramının bir parçası olan duygu teorisine gelindiğinde bu nokta genellikle göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu makalede Spinoza’nın idea kuramı ile inanç kavramı arasındaki ilişkiyi ele alarak Spinoza’ya göre her duygunun en temelde bir tür inanç ve arzudan doğ duğunu göstermeye çalışılacağız. Ayrıca Spinoza’ın duyguları dizginlemek için Ethica’nın beşinci kısmının başında öne sürdüğü terapi yöntemlerinin geçersiz liğini göstermeye çalışacak, Ethica’nın ilk dört kısmından hareketle sunduğu muz duygu teorisinin yardımıyla bu terapi yöntemlerinin “daha Spinozacı” ver siyonlarını sunmaya çalışacağız.

Spinoza’nın Duygu Teorisine Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım: Duygular, İnançlar ve İnsanın Özgürlüğü

Affects are intentional structures of beliefs and desires. Many philos ophers have plausibly argued that Spinoza’s theory of ideas is a kind of theory of belief by this time yet this claim has rarely been taken into account when it comes to Spinoza’s theory of affects, which is actually a part of his theory of ideas. This paper shows that if this point is taken seriously when regarding Spi noza’s theory of affects we reach significant results about the fifth part of Eth ics. To show this, I shall strive to show that all affects depend on some sort of beliefs by analyzing Spinoza’s theory of affects in terms of his theory of ideas, and in particular an affirmation which an idea naturally involves. From this rev elation, we will be able to see that Spinoza’s theory of affects appeared in third and fourth part of Ethics is inconsistent with the fifth part of Ethics in so far as three therapy methods given in the beginning of the fifth part of Ethics are considered. Additionally, and suitably to this assertion, I will also show that ar guments by which soundness of these therapy methods are guaranteed seem ac tually logically invalid. Finally, I will try to revise Spinoza’s therapy methods by taking all errors and core ideas in Spinoza’s theory of affects into consideration.

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