A Dilemma for Epistemic Infinitism

I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true.

Epistemik Sonsuzluk İçin İkilem

Epistemik sonsuzluğun, ancak, doğru olduğunu düşünmek için zemin hazır-layarak kuşkucu-olmayan bir duruş sunabileceğini iddia ediyorum.

Kaynakça

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Kaynak Göster