İdarenin Yargısal Denetiminin Sınırlarına İlişkin Modeller

Hukukun üstünlüğüne dayanan demokratik rejimlerde yürütme organı ve idarenin denetimi ile ilgili farklı modeller öngörülmekle birlikte, yargı denetiminin en etkili denetim şekli olduğunda kuşku bulunmamaktadır. Ancak, yargı denetiminin öngörüldüğü hallerde, denetimin yoğunluğu üzerindeki tartışmalar devam etmektedir. Bu yoğunluk, ülkelerin hukuk geleneklerinden doğrudan etkilenmektedir. Ayrıca denetime ilişkin ilke ve standartların usul hükümlerinde açık ve net olarak belirlenmemesi nedeniyle mahkemeler tarafından içtihat yoluyla bu ilke ve standartlar belirlenmektedir. Denetimin yoğun yapıldığı hallerde mahkemelere yönelik idarenin düzgün işlemesine engel olunduğu, düşük yoğunluklu denetim yapıldığında ise temel haklardan olan hak arama ve etkili yargısal koruma ilkelerinin ihlal edildiği eleştirileri yapılmaktadır. Bu nedenle hem idarenin etkili ve verimli olarak faaliyetini sürdürmesine engel olmayacak, hem de kişi hak ve hürriyetlerinin yeterince korunduğundan emin olunacak bir yargı denetiminin sağlanması gerekmektedir

MODELS IN THE SCOPE OF THE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

It is an undeniable fact that judicial review is the most efficient way for auditing of administrative activities although there are different ways in the supervision of the executive power and administration in democratic systems which are governed by the rule of law. However, the intensity of judicial review is heavily discussed. Legal traditions of countries have an impact on this intensity. Due to the fact that the principles and standarts are not determined in certain and clear terms by legislation, courts hold responsibility to do that .However, criticism to court’ decisions can be seen both circumstances in which courts intend hard-look judicial review or softlook judicial review.When courts just focus on the application of procedural rights and decision making process rather than on the merit of administrative decision, it is said that effective judicial remedy and efficient judicial protection as fundemantal rights are not guaranteed. On the other hand, when judicial review is intensified, the effective functioning of administration is not ensured.Therefore, courts need to strike a fair balance between the effectiveness of administration and the protection of fundamental rights

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