Afrika Birliğinin Askeri Önlemlere Başvurma Hakkı

Afrika Birliği Kurucu Andlaşması’nın 4 (h)- ve 4(j) maddelerinde, örgütün müdahale hakkı düzenlenmiştir. Kurucu Andlaşma’nın söz konusu hükümlerinde, Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşması’na herhangi bir atıf bulunmamaktadır. Oysa Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşması’nın 53. maddesi uyarınca bölgesel örgütlerin Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin izni olmaksızın hiçbir askeri eyleme girişemeyeceği ifade edilmektedir. Çalışmada Afrika Birliğinin askeri önlemlere başvurma hakkı incelenmiştir. Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union regulates the right of intervention of the Union. There is no link between the related articles of the Constituttive Act and United Nations Charter. However Article 53 of the Charter states that no enforcement action shall be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. This paper analyses the right of the African Union to take military measures.

The Right of the African Union to Recourse to Military Measures

Afrika Birliği Kurucu Andlaşması’nın 4 (h)- ve 4(j) maddelerinde, örgütün müdahale hakkı düzenlenmiştir. Kurucu Andlaşma’nın söz konusu hükümlerinde, Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşması’na herhangi bir atıf bulunmamaktadır. Oysa Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşması’nın 53. maddesi uyarınca bölgesel örgütlerin Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin izni olmaksızın hiçbir askeri eyleme girişemeyeceği ifade edilmektedir. Çalışmada Afrika Birliğinin askeri önlemlere başvurma hakkı incelenmiştir. Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union regulates the right of intervention of the Union. There is no link between the related articles of the Constituttive Act and United Nations Charter. However Article 53 of the Charter states that no enforcement action shall be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. This paper analyses the right of the African Union to take military measures.

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