Fehmi Ali ÜNAL, Gökay Gül EMEL

9953

The effects of power imbalance and framing in dyadic negotiations

Müzakereler farklı biçimlerde sıklıkla gerçekleşmelerine ve hemen herkes tarafından kullanılmalarına rağmen, müzakereciler kaynakları genişletmenin ve ortak çıktıları artırmanın mümkün olduğu durumları değerlendirememekte ve genellikle optimal çözümlere ulaşmakta başarısız olmaktadırlar. Güç ve çatışmaların çerçevelenmesi faktörlerinin kaynakların dağıtımını ve anlaşmaların bütünleştiriciliğini (integrativeness) etkilediği literatürde genişçe kabul görmüştür. Ancak, çerçeveleme olgusunun, gücün taraflar arasında asimetrik olarak dağıldığı durumlarda bireysel ve ortak çıktıları nasıl etkileyeceği genel anlamda üzerinde durulmamış bir konudur. Gücün taraflar arasında eşit dağıtılmadığı durumlarda, müzakereyi kazançlar veya kayıplar açısından çerçevelemenin müzakere ile ulaşılan anlaşmalara etkisi deneysel bir çalışma ile araştırılmıştır. Sonuçlar güçlü ve güçsüz tarafların müzakereyi kazançlar veya kayıplar açısından çerçevelemelerinin anlaşmaların bütünleştiriciliğini etkilemediğini, kaynakların taraflar arasında paylaşımını ise önemli ölçüde etkilediğini göstermektedir.

İki taraflı müzakerelerde güç dengesizliği ve çerçevelemin etkileri

Although negotiation, in its various forms, occurs frequently and is used by everyone, negotiators often fail to reach Pareto optimal solutions when there is integrative potential to expand the resources and yield higher joint outcomes. Power and framing of conflicts are two widely acknowledged factors that have been shown to affect distribution of resources and integrativeness of agreements. However, the effects of frame conditions on individual and mutual outcomes in power-asymmetric negotiations are largely unexplored. In an experimental study, we investigated the effect of gain-loss frames on negotiated agreements when power is unequally distributed. The results suggest that while different gain-loss frame adoptions of high and low power parties did not affect the integrativeness of the agreements, the distribution of resources was found to be significantly related to the frame conditions of the parties.
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Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-9975
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 2 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2001
  • Yayıncı: Akdeniz Üniversitesi
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