İstihbarat Kurumlarının Askeri Darbelere Etkisi: Ajax Operasyonu Örneği

Ülkeler çıkarlarını kontrol etme konusunda titiz davranırlar. Petrol, Yirminci Yüzyılın üzerinde en titizlikle durulan konuları arasında gelmektedir. İstihbarat kurumlarının kullanılmasıyla ülke çıkarlarının geri kazanılması ise özellikle Soğuk Savaş Dönemi’nin vazgeçilmez bir yöntemidir. İran’da gerçekleşen Ajax Operasyonu bu konunun en önemli örneklerinden birisidir. Bu çalışmada; İstihbarat kurumlarının dış ülkelerdeki müdahaleleri sonucunda askeri darbelere nasıl etki ettikleri Ajax Operasyonu özelinde ele alınacaktır. Olayın daha net anlaşılabilmesi adına ilk olarak Ajax Operasyonuna giden süreçte Musaddık Dönemi ele alınacak ve darbeye giden süreçler anlatılacaktır. Sonraki bölümde Ajax Operasyonu’nun nasıl gerçekleştiğinden ve istihbarat kurumlarının etkilerinden bahsedilecektir.

The Effect of Intelligence Agencies on Military Coups: The Case of Ajax Operation

Countries are scrupulous about controlling their interests. Oil is one of the most meticulously focused topics of the twentieth century. The recovery of the country's interests through the use of intelligence institutions is an indispensable method, especially in the Cold War Period. Ajax Operation in Iran is one of the most important examples of this issue. In this study, the issue of how intelligence agencies affect military coups as a result of their intervention in foreign countries will be discussed in the context of Operation Ajax. In order to understand the incident more clearly, firstly the period leading to the Ajax Operation will be discussed and the processes leading to the coup will be explained. In the next section, how the Ajax Operation took place and the effects of intelligence agencies will be mentioned.

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