Secure access control in multidomain environments and formal analysis of model specifications

Secure access control in multidomain environments and formal analysis of model specifications

Distributed multiple organizations interact with each other. If the domains employ role-based access control,one method for interaction between domains is role-mapping. However, it may violate constraints in the domainssuch as role hierarchy, separation of duty, and cardinality. Therefore, autonomy of the domains is lost. This paperproposes secure interoperation in multidomain environments. For this purpose, a cross-domain is created by foreignpermission assignment. In an effort to maintain the autonomy of every domain, several rules are defined formally. Then,a decentralized scheme is used to provide permission mapping between domains. At the next stage, the proposed crossdomain is specified using Alloy, the first logic language. Subsequently, validity of the rules is analyzed through Alloyanalyzer

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