From traditional into tailored: The evolution of the concept of deterrence in the post-cold war era

Güvenlik çalışmaları alanında son dönemde Türkiye’de büyük bir akademik merak belirmesine rağmen, ne yazık ki, bu alandaki literatür oldukça yetersizdir. Bundan dolayı da bu alanda hâlen çoğunlukla eksik anlaşılan veya yanlış kullanılan pek çok kavram mevcuttur. Rakibin stratejik kararlarını etkileme amacı güden zorlama stratejilerinin en önemlilerinden biri olan “caydırıcılık” da bu kavramlardan birisidir. Bu çalışma, caydırıcılık kavramının genel çerçevesini çizdikten sonra bu kavramın çağdaş güvenlik ortamında geçerliliğini sorgulamaktadır. Çalışmanın cevabını aradığı temel soru, realist okulun temel öğretilerinden biri olan “Eğer ister isen sulh-u salah, her daim hazır ol harb-ü cenge” anlayışının hâlen geçerliliğini koruyup korumadığıdır. Çünkü Soğuk Savaş yıllarında uluslararası sistemin göreceli bir dengeye oturmasında önemli işlevi olan caydırıcılık konseptinin oldukça karmaşık olan çağdaş güvenlik ortamında beliren “asimetrik” tehditlere karşı hâlen kullanılıp kullanılamayacağı konusunda şüpheler belirmiştir. Tüm bu şüphelere rağmen bu çalışmanın ana tezi, genişletilmiş ve yeniden biçimlendirilmiş caydırıcılık konseptinin bu yeni dönemde de karar alıcıların stratejik malzeme kutusundaki ayrıcalıklı yerini korumaya devam edeceğidir. Çalışma, bu tezi ABD’nin 9/11 sonrası güvenlik ortamında uygulamaya soktuğu “biçimlendirilmiş caydırıcılık” konseptini ve temel özelliklerinin bir analizini sunarak desteklemektedir.

Gelenekselden biçimlendirilmişe: Soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde caydırıcılık konseptinin değişimi

Although there has emerged an enormous intellectual curiosity lately in the field of security studies in Turkey, the literature in this field is weak. There are, therefore, still commonly misused, and consequently misunderstood, terms which spread ambiguity in academic community in security studies. The concept of ‘deterrence’, a coercive strategy to influence the strategic choices of the adversary – a nationstate in traditional sense, is one of these. After framing the concept of deterrence accurately, this article discusses the relevancy of the concept of deterrence in the contemporary security environment. The overall question this paper seeks to answer is whether the motto of “Si vis pacem, para bellum” relevant or not in the post-Cold War environment. Traditional deterrence perfectly worked as a principal strategy to influence interstate relations during the Cold War. Mainly through means of this concept, the bipolar world order had achieved a relative stability. Some, however, contend that the change from a relatively symmetrical situation of ‘mutual’ deterrence to the asymmetric threats that dominate the contemporary security environment breeds doubts on the relevancy of deterrence when meeting contemporary threats. In contrasts to these opinions, the overall argument of this article is that a broadened concept of deterrence with military and non-military means remains a fundamental instrument in the strategic tool box of policy makers, even against asymmetric threats. To prove this argument, this study lays out the primary features of ‘tailored deterrence’ applied by the U.S. in the post-9/11 security environment.

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