Kar yönetimi ve yöntemleri

Kar yönetimi, finansal raporlama sürecinde yöneticilerin takdir yetkilerini kullanmaları sonucunda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Birtakım işlemler yoluyla ya da Genel Kabul Görmüş Muhasebe İlkeleri’ndeki (GKGMİ) esnekliklerden faydalanılarak uygulanan kar yönetimi, finansal tablo kullanıcılarına yanıltıcı bilgi vermesi nedeniyle son derece önemli bir konu haline gelmektedir. GKGMİ, işletmenin gerçek finansal durumunu yansıtabilmeleri açısından, muhasebe tercihlerini yaparken, yöneticilere, birçok seçenek sunmaktadır. Bu seçenekler ise kar yönetimi uygulamalarına olanak sağlayabilmektedir. Çünkü yöneticiler, bunları, işletmenin veya kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda kullanabilmektedirler. Bu durum ise finansal raporların gerçeği yansıtmasına engel olacaktır. Bu çalışmanın amacı kar yönetimine, hile ile kar yönetimi arasındaki farklara ve kar yönetiminde kullanılan yöntemlere ilişkin bilgiler verilmektedir.

Earnıngs management and ıts methods

Earnings management occurs when managers use their judgment in financial reporting process. Earnings management which is applied either through some transactions or by utilizing the flexibilities in the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), is crucial for financial statement users for misleading them. This study focuses on earnings management and the techniques applied. While managers were making their accounting choices, GAAP provides them lots of alternatives to reveal the real financial statement of the business. These accounting choices may enable earnings management. For managers may exploit these choices for themselves or the business. And this situation will prevent financial reports to reveal the real statement of the business. This study focuses on earnings management, differences between earnings management and fraud, and earnings management techniques

Kaynakça

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Kaynak Göster