POLİTİK İSTİKRARSIZLIK, BELİRSİZLİK VE MAKROEKONOMİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ (1970-2006)

Bu çalışma; GARCH ve EGARCH modellerini kullanarak 1970-2006 yılları arasında Türkiye’de politik istikrarsızlık, belirsizlik ve makroekonomik göstergelerin (ekonomik büyüme, enflasyon, döviz kuru) oynaklığı arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektir. Politik istikrarsızlık göstergeleri olarak altı farklı istikrarsızlık değişkenine (genel seçimler, yerel seçimler, askeri darbe dönemleri, referandumlar, koalisyonlar, grev) ait temel bileşenler kullanılmıştır. GARCH ve EGARCH modellerinden elde edilen bulgulara göre, politik istikrarsızlığın ekonomik büyüme üzerinde negatif ve enflasyon üzerinde pozitif etkisi olduğu, buna karşın döviz kurları üzerinde etkisinin çok güçlü olmadığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Makroekonomik performans, Politik istikrarsızlık, GARCH ve EGARCH modelleri

POLITICAL INSTABILITY, UNCERTAINTY AND MACROECONOMICS: THE CASE OF TURKEY (1970-2006)

This study investigates relationship between political instability, uncertainty and volatility of macroeconomic outcomes in the context of economic growth, inflation and exchange rates in Turkey for the period 1970 through 2006 using GARCH and EGARCH models. Political instability indicators has been defined as principal compenents of six different instability variables (genereal elections, local elections, coup d'états, referendums, coalition periods and number strikes per year). According to results, estimated by GARCH and EGARCH models, political instability have negative impacts on economic growth and positive affect on ınflation rate, whereas it’s affect on exchange rates is not strong enough.

Keywords:

Macreconomic performance, Political instability, GARCH and EGARCH models,

PDF

___

ABDIWELI, M.A., “Political Instability, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation”, Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol.29, 2001, s.87-106.
ALESINA, A.,R. PEROTTI, “Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment”, NBER working Paper Series, No:4486, 1993, s.3.
ALESINA, A., COHEN, G.D., N. ROUBINI, “Macroeonomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies”, Economics and Politics, Vol.4, 1992, s.1-30.
ALESINA, A., J.SACHS, “Political Parties and the Business Cycles in the United States: 1948-1984”, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Vol.20, 1988, s.63-82.
ALESINA, A., ġ.ÖZLER, N.ROUBINI ve P.SWAGEL, “Political Instability and Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol:1, 1996, s.189-211.
ASTERIOU, D., S. PRICE, “Political Instability and Economic Growth: UK Time Series Evidence”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol:48, No:4, 2001, 383-399.
BARRO, R.J., “Democracy and Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol:1, 1996, s.1-27.
BARRO, R.J., “Economic Growth in a Cross-section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.5, 1991, s.407-443.
BARRO, R.J., Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study, Camridge, MIT Press, 1997.
BOLLERSLEV, T., “Generalized Autoregressive Heteroskedasticity”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol.31, 1986, s.307 327.
BRUNETTI, A., “Political Variables in Growth Regressions”, içinde (ed: S.Borner ve M.Paldam) “The Political Dimension of Economic Growth”, International Economic Associaton Series, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire Ġngiltere, 1998, s.117-135.
BUCHANAN, J.M., G.Tullock, The Calculus of Consent Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, University of Michgan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965.
BUCHANAN, J.M., R.E. Wagner, “Democracy in Coalition”, Public Choice, Vol.26, 1979, s.29-49.
BUSSIERE, M., C. Mulder, “Political Instability and Economic Vulnerabilty”, IMF Working Paper, WP/99/46, 1991, s.17.
CAMPOS, N.F., J.B. NUGENT, “Who is Afraid of Political Instability?”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.67, 2002, s.157-172.
DOĞAN, A., “Demokrasi ve Ekonomik GeliĢme”, Erciyes Üniversitesi ĠĠBF Dergisi, Sayı 25, 2005, s.1-19.
EDWARDS, S., G. TABELLINI, “Political Instability, Political Weakness and Inflation: An Empirical Analysis”, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.3721, 1991, s.19.
ENGLE, R.F., “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation”, Econometrica, Vol.50, 1982, s.987-1007.
FENG, Y., “Political Freedom, Political Instability and Political Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions and Private Investment in Developing Countries”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.45, 2001, s.271-94.
FOSU, A.K., “Political Instability and Economic Growth: Evidence from SubSaharan Africa”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No.4, 1992, s.829-841.
HECKELMAN, J., H. BERUMENT, “Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol.19, 1998, s.651-68.
KLOMP, J., D.H. JAKOB, “Political Institutions and Economic Volatility”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.25, 2009, s.311-26.
LENSINK, R., N.HERMES, V.MURINDE, “Capital Flight and Political Risk”, Journal of Money and Finance, Vol.19, 2000, s.73-92.
MALLEY, J., A.PHILIPPOPOULOS, U.WOITEk, “Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Fluctuations”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol.31, 2007, s.1051-80.
NELSON,D.B., “Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach”, Econometrica, Vol.59, 1991, s.347-70.
PALDAM, M., “Inflation and Political Instability in Eight Latin American Countries 1946-83”, Public Choice, 52, 1987, s.143-68.
PERRY, R.L., J.D. ROBERTSON, “Political Markets, Bond Markets and the Effect of Uncertainty: A Cross-National Analysis”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.42, 1998, s.131-60.
ROBERTSON, J.D., “The Political Economy and the Durability of European Coalisition Cabinets: New Variations on a Game-Theoric Perspective”, Journal of Politics, Vol.45, 1983, s.932-57.
STROM, K., “Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
TELATAR, F., “Türkiye’de Politika DeğiĢkenliği ile Ekonomik Büyüme Arasındaki Nedensellik ĠliĢkileri”, ĠĢletme ve Finans, 211, 2003, 71-91.