Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Program and the DoD AT&L Reform Policy

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Program and the DoD AT&L Reform Policy

This report assesses the compliance of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle program of the US DoD with the Reform Policy declared with the issuance of a guidance memorandum by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (DoD AT&L) in 2010. A thorough evaluation of the program reveals that the MRAP program displayed successful examples at achieving reform objectives such as making time a key parameter, incentivizing productivity and innovation in the industry, and reducing non-productive processes and bureaucracy. However, some practices are subject to criticism such as failures in mandating affordability as a requirement, eliminating redundancy within warfighter portfolios, limiting the use of time-and-materials contracts and promoting real competition for services.     

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