Oyunlarda Öğrenme: İki Deney

İktisat bilimine deneysel yaklaşımlar son 40 yılda popülerliğini artırmış ve ampi- rik analizde önemli araçlardan biri haline gelmiştir. Davranışları matematiksel te- mellerde modellenen ajanların daima rasyonel davrandığı düşünülürken bu mo- dellerin test edilmesi ve bireylerin farklı durumlarda aldığı kararların incelenebil- mesi sağlanmıştır. Bu makalede, iki farklı ortamda yapılan deney ile bu durumu örneklendireceğiz. Braess paradoksu, günlük hayatta her bir bireyin karşılaştığı yol seçimi sorununu konu edinirken, Cournot oligipol modeli ise miktar rekabe- ti durumunda verilen üretim kararı üzerinden karar alma davranışını incelemek- tedir. Bu çalışma, rasyonel karar alma kabiliyetini farklı alanlarda eğitim alan öğ- renciler üzerinden Braess paradoksu ve Cournot modeli dahilinde deneysel ola- rak incelemektedir.

Learning in Games: Two Experiments

Experimental methods are even more popular in the last 40 years and became one of the fundamental instruments of empirical economic researches. Experi- mental economics provides a way to test the mathematical models created to explain the behaviours of economic agents and to observe those behaviours un- der different circumstances. In this paper, we will conduct two experiments to il- lustrate. The first experiment is on the Braess paradox suggesting that adding an additional route to a road topology may increase the amount spent in traffic when the drivers selfishly choose their route and the second is a Cournot oligo- poly environment; quantity competition suggesting that competing firms will pro- duce less than competitive quantity and more than collusive amount. This pa- per, explores the ability of rational decision making experimentally, in the scope of Braess Paradox and Cournot Oligopoly Model with two groups of participators for both experiments from different educational backgrounds.

Kaynakça

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Kaynak Göster