The Effect of Directors' Index on Firm Performance: An Evidence from BIST100 Firms

Bu çalışmada, BIST100 endeksinde yer alanşirketler için kurumsal yönetim kalitesi ve firmaperformansı arasındaki ilişki incelenmektedir.Kurumsal yönetim kalitesi, temsilci çatışmalarınıazaltan bir mekanizma olarak kabul edilmiş ve buazalışın artan firma performansıyla sonuçlanacağıvarsayılmıştır. Çalışmada, Yönetici endeksi (D- INDEX), kurumsal yönetim kalitesinin birgöstergesi kabul edilmiş ve çalışmayı literatürdeyer alan benzer çalışmalardan farklılaştırmakamaçlanmıştır. Bu endeksi oluşturmak içinBushee vd. (2010) çalışmasından yararlanılmıştır.Ampirik bulgulara göre D-INDEXin firmaperformansı üzerinde herhangi bir etkisibulunmamıştır. İkinci aşama olarak, firmaperformansı ve D-INDEX arasındaki ilişki farklıendüstrilerdeki şirketler için incelenmiş veelektrik endüstrisindeki şirketlerden yüksekkurumsal yönetim kalitesine sahip şirketlerin,yüksek performansa sahip olduğu sonucunaulaşılmıştır. Söz konusu şirketlerin kurumsalyönetimdeki değişiklikleri çabuk uygulamayageçirmeleri bu sonuca ulaşmada etkili olmuştur..

Yönetici Endeksi (D-INDEX) nın Firma Performansı Üzerıne Etkisi: Bist 100 Şirketleri Üzerıne Bir Araştırma

This study investigates the relation betweencorporate governance quality and f irmperformance of firms listed in Borsa İstanbul 100index (BIST100). With accepting corporategovernance as a mechanism to reduce the agencyconf licts between managers and shareholders,we assume that this reduction results withincreased f irm perf ormance. We diff erentiate thisstudy f rom the existing literature by acceptingdirectors index (D-INDEX) as a proxy f orcorporate governance quality f or the companiesexisted in BIST100. We f ollow Bushee et al. (2010)to create D-INDEX. Our f indings indicate that D- INDEX does not have any eff ect on corporateperf ormance of BIST100 f irms. As a second step,we examine the relation between f irmperf ormance and D-INDEX f or each industry in ourdataset. We f ind that among the f irms inelectricity industry those have high level ofcorporate governance quality have high level off irm perf ormance. We explain this result with thequick adj ustments of these f irms to the changesin corporate governance.

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Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi-Cover

ISSN: 1306-6730
Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
Başlangıç: 2006
Yayıncı: Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi