From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model

In this essay, after first briefly reviewing the literature on experimental philosophy and how and why it is important especially for contemporary analytic philosophy, we focus on two earliest experimental research papers on free will intuitions. We also present psychological mechanisms that try to explain why both philosophers and ordinary people have incompatibilist and compatibilist intuitions and free will and moral responsibility. We then move on to another experimental research on moral intuitions and develop a dual process model based on the model to explain moral intuitions. However, our dual interacting-process model is not intended for moral intuitions but free will intuitions. Finally, we critically examine other mechanisms and briefly defend our model.

Ahlaki Sezgilerden Özgür İrade Sezgilerine: İkili Etkileşim Süreci Modeli

Bu makalede, deneysel felsefe hakkındaki yazını ve deneysel felsefenin, özellikle çağdaş analitik felsefe için nasıl ve neden önemli olduğunu özetledikten sonra özgür irade sezgisi konulu ilk iki deneysel araştırma makalelerine odaklanıyoruz. Ayrıca neden hem felsefecilerin hem de felsefeci olmayanların özgür irade ve ahlaki sorumluluk konusundaki uyumsuzcu ve uyumcu sezgilerinin olduğunu açıklamaya çalışan kuramları sunuyoruz. Daha sonra ise ahlaki sezgiler hakkındaki bir başka deneysel araştırmaya geçiyoruz ve ahlaki sezgileri açıklamak için önerilen modeli esas alan bir ikili süreç modeli geliştiriyoruz. Ancak bizim geliştirdiğimiz ikili karşılıklı etkileşimli süreç modeli ahlaki sezgileri değil özgür irade sezgilerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Son olarak da önerilen diğer mekanizmaları eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirirken kendi modelimizi kısaca savunuyoruz.

PDF

___

Blair, R. J. (2007). The Amygdala and Ventro-medial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality Psychopathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 387–392.

Cova, F. & Bertoux, M. & Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Dubois, B. (2012). Judgments about Moral Responsibility and Determinism in Patients with Behavioral Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Still Compatibilists. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 851–864.

Doherty, G. J. M. (2010). Intuitions, Cross-Cultural Cognition, and Experimental Philosophy. (PhD Thesis). Ontario: University of Western Ontario.

Fischer, E. & John. C. (2015). Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. London and New York.

Glenn, A L. & Iyer, R. & Graham, J. & Koleva, S. & Haidt, J. (2009). Are All Types of Morality Compromised in Psychopathy. Journal of Personality Disorders, 23 (4), 384–398.

Greene, J. D. & Sommerville, B. & Nystrom, L. E. & Darley, J. M. & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An FMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. Science, 5537, 2105-2108.

Greene, J. (2013). Moral Tribes Emotion, Reason and the Gap Between Us and Them. London: Atlantic Books.

Mallon, R. & Nichols, S. (2006). Moral Dilemmas and Moral Rules. Cognition, 100, 530-542.

Mandelbaum, E. & Ripley, D. (2012). Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 351.

Murray, D. & Nahmias, E. (2014). Explaining away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88 (2), 434-467.

Nahmias, E. & Morris, S. G. & Nadelhoffer, T. & Turner, J. (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology, 18 (5), 561-584.

Nahmias, E. & Coates, D. J. & Kvaran, T. (2007). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31 (1), 214-242.

Nahmias, E. & Murray, D. (2010). Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions. (Eds. J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff & K. Frankish). New Waves in Philosophy of Action. London: Palgrave- Macmillan, 189-215.

Nichols, S. & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Nous, 41 (4), 663-685.

Nichols, S. & Knobe, J. (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nanay, B. (2015). Experimental Philosophy and Naturalism. (Eds. E. Fischer & J. Collins). Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism and Naturalism Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge: London and New York: Routledge.

Prinz, J.J. (2008). Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy. (Eds. J. Knobe & S. Nichols). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rose, D. & Danks, D. (2013). In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy. Metaphilosophy, 44 (4), 512-532.

Sarkissian, H. & Chatterjee, A. & De Brigard, F. & Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. & Sirker, S. (2010). Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal? Mind & Language, 25, 346-358.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Abstract +Concrete =Paradox. (Eds. J. Knobe & S. Nichols). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209-232.

Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy-Cover

ISSN: 1303-8303
Başlangıç: 2011
Yayıncı: Mustafa Çevik

Arşiv