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YARGILARIN NASIL HAKLILANACAĞI DOĞRU BİR SORU OLARAK KALMAKTADIR

Bu makalede yargıların dayandığı temel unsurlar ve ilkeler üzerinden önerme ve argumanlarda tutarlılık, geçerlilik ve gerçeklik tartışmalarının haklılama için dayandığı unsurlar üzerinde durulmaktadır. Doğruluk değerlendirmelerinin dayandığı yargılar ele alınırken, kavramsal süreçlerin bu süreçteki eleştirel yeri tartışılmış, epistemik yargılamaların kabuller, inançlar, zanlar, tasdiklerin geçerlilik ve tutarlıkla olan ilişkileri üzerindeki problemler tartışılmıştır

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Yargılar, Kabuller, Doğruluk iddiaları, Haklılama, Epistemik Yargılama

HOW JUDGEMENTS ARE TO BE JUSTIFIED REMAINS A FAIR QUESTION

This paper deals with the importance of logical analysis for establishing our judgments of “justified beliefs” for deciding on truth values in reasoning. Primarily thought developing processes for justification has been analysed through establishing ground discussions for propositions and syllogism. I analyse structures of judgements which are established on analysis of Truthclaims. Conceptual processes are essential part of this critique of justification for truth-values. Also epistemic preferences grounds conviction, assurance, acceptance, assumption, decision, and belief for validity and coherency

Keywords:

Judgments, Belief, Truth-claims, Justifications, Epistemic Justification,

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