Bu makale İbn Sînâ’nın “ikinci makuller” görüşünün kendinden önce süregelen dil-mantık tartışmasına bir cevap olarak geliştirildiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. İbn Sînâ’nın yaşadığı asırdan bir asır önce Bağdat felsefe okulunu kuran mantıkçılarından biri olarak Ebû Bişr Mettâ’nın (ö. 328/940) dilci Sîrâfî ile (ö. 365/977) girdiği tartışmadaki durumu okulun sonraki mensuplarını tatmin etmemiş gözükmektedir. Bu yüzden Mettâ’nın doğrudan öğrencileri olan Fârâbî (ö. 338/950) ve Yahyâ b. Adî (ö. 362/974) gibi okulun sonraki mensupları bu tartışmaya yönelik yeni cevaplar üretmeye başlamış, böylece tartışma içinde hocalarını yetersiz gördükleri hususları tamamlamak istemişlerdir. Bu bağlamda onların çabası, dilden ayrı bir konusunun olduğunu göstermek suretiyle mantığın konumunu belirginleştirmek şeklinde olmuştur. Bağdat okulu mantıkçıları bunu yapmak için mantığın konusunun “tümel anlamlar ve onlara delalet eden lafızlar” olduğunu vurgulamış ve böylece mantığın, lafızları dil biliminde olduğu gibi incelemediğini göstermek istemişlerdir. Buna rağmen lafızlar hâlâ mantığın konusu olarak kalmıştır. Bu ilmin konusunun belirginleştirilmesi yönündeki tutum aynıyla İbn Sînâ’nın eserlerinde de görülmektedir. Ancak seleflerinden farklı olarak o, mantığın konusunun lafızlarla ilişkilendirilmesinden oldukça rahatsız olmuş ve önceki filozofları bu hususta eleştirmiştir. İbn Sînâ’ya göre çözüm, mantığın konusu olan şeyleri lafızlardan bağımsız olarak ele almaktır ki “ikinci makuller” öğretisi, kendisinin “konusu itibariyle mantığı dilden soyutlama” düşüncesine güçlü bir argüman teşkil etmiştir. İşte bu yazı İbn Sînâ’nın bu öğretisini önceki filozoflara yönelik eleştirisiyle birlikte yorumlamakta ve dil-mantık tartışmasına bir cevap olarak değerlendirmektedir.

In this article, my analysis will show that Avicenna’s doctrine of “the second intelligibles” was posited as a response to an ongoing debate about the relationship between logic and grammar. Apparently, the logician and philosopher al-Mattā’s (d. 328/940) defense of logic against the grammarian al-Sīrāfī (d. 365/977) in the debate on the subject, which emerged one generation prior to Avicenna, did not satisfy the subsequent members of Baghdād’s philosophy school. After this debate, the prominent members of this school, such as al-Fārābī (d. 338/950), Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d. 362/974), Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (d. c. 380/991) and Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1044), introduced new arguments to this debate that strengthened the position of logicians against grammarians. They clarified the position of logic as they asserted that the subject matter of logic is distinct from that of grammar. To achieve this, the logicians of the Baghdād school pointed to the difference between logicians and grammarians in dealing with vocal forms, indicating that logicians deal with “the universal meanings and the expressions insofar as they signify universal meanings.” This is contrary to the grammarians who are concerned with the expressions without focusing on their universal meanings. It appears that al-Fārābī and his pupil Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī devoted extra effort to elaborating upon their approaches regarding the distinctness of logic from grammar. In his distinctive work on the classification of sciences, Ihṣā’ al-‘ulūm, al-Fārābī accords grammar and the other linguistic sciences a special place in his system. Furthermore, he meticulously separates logic and language in terms of their subject matters when considering the relationship between them. Following a similar line of thought, his pupil Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī penned a special treatise on the differentiation of logic and grammar, titled, al-Faṣl bayna ṣinā‘atay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa’l-naḥw al-‘Arabī. In this work, he defines both disciplines in terms of their purposes and subject matters and then argues that logic, unlike grammar, examines universal meanings and their vocal forms; however, it does not deal with vocal forms in a similar manner to grammar. For Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, logic and grammar are different disciplines because their subject matters are distinct. Still, vocal forms or expressions remain the subject matter of logic in their works. Even the last member of logicians of the Baghdād school, Abū’l-Faraj Ibn al-Ṭayyib, says in his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge that “the subject matter of the art of logic is the simple vocal forms which refer to common ideas (al-ṣuwar al-‘āmmah)”. The Baghdād school claims that language is inadequate to deal with the reality whereas logic adequately shows what is true and false in the theoretical domain and what is good and bad in the practical. Among the members of the Baghdād school, al-Fārābī is the logician who expressed his opinion on the subject matter of logic in a manner closest to Avicenna. In his Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf), which is one of his most important works concerning the philosophy of language, al-Fārābī posits that the “first intelligible meanings” is the subject matter of logic. Moreover, he mentions the “second intelligibles” and uses it as a technical term, linking it to the subject matter of logic prior to Avicenna. Contrary to Avicenna’s works, in al-Fārābī’s Book of Letters, “the vocal forms” appears as the subject matter of logic. Al-Fārābī considers “the first intelligibles” as the focus of all sciences—political sciences, natural sciences, mathematics, metaphysics and logic. However, he stresses that logic is also interested in the vocal forms of “the first intelligibles” whereas the other sciences disregard the vocal forms. The Fārābian doctrine continues to examine the vocal forms and for this reason Avicenna criticizes al-Fārābī and the other members of the Baghdād school. Avicenna was also interested in the question of the subject matter of logic. However, as opposed to al-Fārābī and the other members of the Baghdād school, he was dissatisfied with identifying the subject matter of logic with their vocal utterances. He, therefore, criticized his predecessors’ position on this problem. For him, meanings, apart from their vocal utterances, must be considered as the subject matter of logic. In the introductory part of al-Madkhal of al-Shifā’, Avicenna objects to logicians who argued that the logician qua logician should be concerned with vocal forms. This might be read as a contrasted view and a criticism of al-Fārābī and the Baghdād school. Avicenna was concerned with the relationships among mental contents rather than the ones between the mental content and vocal form. Therefore, he articulates that the subject matter of logic is the second intelligibles, which is based on the first intelligibles. He did not consider the first intelligibles or their vocal forms as the subject matter of logic. Rather, he asserts that since “the second intelligibles” are the meanings abstracted from the meanings in mind, i.e. the first intelligibles, they are the things that are more suitable for the subject matter of logic. In my view, Avicenna’s doctrine of the “second intelligibles” provided him with a profound instrument in introducing the notion of “the separation of logic from grammar in terms of the subject matter”. This article surveys Avicenna’s doctrine of “the second intelligibles”, accounting for his critique of his predecessors and understanding this doctrine as a response to the debate of logic and language.