TÜRKİYE’DE FIRSATÇI VE PARTİZAN POLİTİK KONJONKTÜREL DALGALANMALAR: 1950-2010

Politik Konjonktürel Dalgalanmalar (PKD) Teorisi, siyasal karar alma sürecinde yer alan politika yapıcıların ekonomik değişkenler üzerinde dalgalanmalara yol açtığını iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışmada Türkiye’de fırsatçı ve partizan modellere göre PKD analiz edilmiştir. 1950-2010 dönemindeki kamu harcamalarının seyrinde politik amaçlı bir sapmanın olup olmadığı otoregresif hareketli ortalamalar yöntemi ile test edilmiştir. Elde edilen bulgulara göre Türkiye’de fırsatçı ve partizan politik konjonktürel dalgalanmalar geçerlidir. Bununla birlikte partizan modele ilişkin kanıtlar net değildir.

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The Theory of Political Business Cycles (PBC) suggests that policy makers taking part in political decision-making process cause cycles on economic variables. This paper analyzes PBC according to opportunistic and partisan models  in Turkey. The autoregressive integrated moving average method is used  to determine whether there is a political deviation in the course of public spending between 1950 and 2010. The emprical results show that opportunistic and partisan political business cycles are valid in Turkey. However the evidence related to partisan model is not clear

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