IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON THE ECONOMY AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF DONBAS

The political crisis that resulted in unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine evolved into a war between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents. A large-scale military conflict has undoubtedly produced an extremely negative impact on the country's economic potential, not very strong as it was. It encompasses both the outcomes of the direct destruction of the economy in the region – both the occupied areas and those controlled by Ukraine – and problems caused to enterprises directly connected with it. Implementation of an entire range of long-due political, social and economic reforms at present opens the window of opportunity to a radical response, but at the same time requires very precise coordination of specific innovations addressable specifically to Donbas, with the universal ones to be applied throughout Ukraine, and with the commitments that the state undertook within the EU association. Lack of resources considerably limits the possibilities to channel budget funds for Donbas recovery; expectations of foreign investment may not materialize, therefore extremely important is the mobilization of funds of the population

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON THE ECONOMY AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF DONBAS

The political crisis that resulted in unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine evolved into a war between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents. A large-scale military conflict has undoubtedly produced an extremely negative impact on the country's economic potential, not very strong as it was. It encompasses both the outcomes of the direct destruction of the economy in the region – both the occupied areas and those controlled by Ukraine – and problems caused to enterprises directly connected with it. Implementation of an entire range of long-due political, social and economic reforms at present opens the window of opportunity to a radical response, but at the same time requires very precise coordination of specific innovations addressable specifically to Donbas, with the universal ones to be applied throughout Ukraine, and with the commitments that the state undertook within the EU association. Lack of resources considerably limits the possibilities to channel budget funds for Donbas recovery; expectations of foreign investment may not materialize, therefore extremely important is the mobilization of funds of the population

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APA Ramos, F. F. R. & Kovalenko, O. O. (2016). IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON THE ECONOMY AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF DONBAS . Journal of Life Economics , 3 (3) , 27-38 . DOI: 10.15637/jlecon.148