ÖRGÜTLER ARASI İLİŞKİLERDE SÖZLEŞME TASARIMINI ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER

Bu çalışmanın amacı, sözleşme tasarımının ekonomik rasyonelini araştıran çalışmalar üzerine bir değerlendirme yapmaktır. Bu amaçla Parkhe’nin (1993) sözleşmenin karmaşıklık derecesini etkileyen işlemsel ve ilişkisel belirleyiciler üzerine gerçekleştirdiği çalışmadan yola çıkılarak bir literatür taraması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sözleşme tasarımı üzerinde işlemle ilişkili faktörler, güven, önceki ilişkilerden elde edilen deneyim ve örgütler arası öğrenme çabalarının belirleyici olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Ayrıca sözleşme tasarımını etkileyen faktörlerin sözleşmenin boyutları (sözleşmenin karmaşıklığı, sözleşme şartlarının özgüllüğü, koşul planlaması ve sözleşmenin bağlayıcılığı) üzerinde farklı etkiler yaratmakta olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu nedenle sözleşme tasarımını etkileyen faktörleri yönetişim meseleleri (teminat, eşgüdümleme ve uyarlanma) ve sözleşmenin boyutları (sözleşmenin karmaşıklığı, sözleşmenin süresi, sözleşme şartlarının özgüllüğü, koşul planlaması, sözleşmenin bağlayıcılığı vs.) arasındaki ilişkileri dikkate alarak açıklayan gelecek çalışmaların literatüre katkı sağlayabileceği düşünülebilir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma sözleşme tasarımını etkileyen faktörleri araştırmayı hedefleyen gelecek çalışmalar için örgüt iktisadı ve stratejik yönetim bakış açıları temelinde bütünleştirici bir kavramsal model önermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Sözleşmenin Karmaşıklığı, Sözleşmenin Eksiksizliği, İşlemle İlişkili Faktörler, Deneyimle İlişkili Faktörler

ÖRGÜTLER ARASI İLİŞKİLERDE SÖZLEŞME TASARIMINI ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER / DRIVING FACTORS OF CONTRACT DESIGN IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The aim of this study is to provide an assessment of the empirical studies on the economic rationality of designing a contract. For this purpose, this study set out Parkhe’s work (1993) that explores the transactional and relational determinants of the degree of contractual complexity. This study shows that transaction-related factors, trust, experience gained from prior relationships and inter-organizational learning efforts are the determinants of contractual design. In addition, the factors affecting the contract design have different effects on each dimension of the contract (contractual complexity, term specificity, contingency planning and contractual obligatoriness). Hence, future research can contribute to the literature if it aims to explore the antecedents of contract design by considering the relationships between governance problems (safeguarding, coordination and adaptation) and contractual dimensions (contractual complexity, duration of the contract, term specificity, contractual obligatoriness etc.). In conclusion, this study proposes an integrative conceptual model based on the perspectives of organizational economics and strategic management for future research that aims to explore the antecedents of contractual design.

Keywords:

Contractual Complexity, Contractual Completeness, Transaction-related Factors, Experience-related Factors.,

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