NECMETTİN ERBAKAN KİMLİK, SİYASET VE DIŞ POLİTİKA

Modern Türk siyaseti İttihat ve Terakki Partisi'nden tevarüs eden, egemen asker-sivil-bürokrat ve aydın sınıfın mutlak iktidarı üzerin inşa edilmişti. Türk modernleşmesinin dayandığı bu dinamikler; seküler bir alan inşa etmiş, inanç ve ahlaki tercihlerin siyasi bir aktör olmasına müsaade etmemiştir. İnanç ve ahlaki belirleyicilerin terbiyesi de bürokratik aygıtlar üzerinden gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda Türk siyasal hayatında süregelen çatışmaların temelinde bürokratik aşkıncılığın yattığı söylenebilir. Ulus kimliğin yönetilmesinde, ordu-milli irade bütünlüğü ile başlayan ve milli mücadelede halkla birlikte hareket edebilen bürokratik elit, sonrasında toplumsal değerlerle çatışan, halka rağmen halk için anlayışını benimsemiştir. 1970'lerde Kemalist paradigmanın yetersizliği Türk siyasetinde Milli Görüş'ün doğuşunu hızlandırmıştır. Dindar kimliğin toplumsal ve siyasal alandan ötekileştirildiği Kemalist ulus devlet sisteminde Milli Görüş hareketi, siyasal söylemi ile dindar kimliği ve kökleri arasına sıkışan bir durum sergilemiştir. Milli Görüş "yasakçı sınırlar" içinde siyasi meşruiyetini koruma ve mesajını topluma iletebilecek yeni dil ve "kavramlaştırmalar" ile siyasal alanda tezahür etmiştir. Bu kapsamda, Milli Görüş Hareketinin mimari Necmettin Erbakan, siyasal söylem paradigması ile çok boyutluluk ve çeşitlilik içeren bir çizgi geliştirmiştir. Erbakan'ın siyasette kullandığı dil, ifade ve parti sloganları muğlak ve belirsiz söylemler olmaktan çok bir özne olarak milleti var eden kökleri referans almıştır. Bu çalışmada, Türk siyasi kimliğin inşasında, "Yeniden Büyük Türkiye" ve "Yeni Bir Dünya" idealini Türk Dış Politikasında yön ve hedef olarak belirleyen, D-8'lerin (Developing eights) kurucusu Necmettin Erbakan'ın siyaset anlayışı, liderlik özellikleri birçok yönden analiz edilmeye çalışılarak, Erbakan'ın başbakanlığı dönemindeki dış politikası incelenmiştir

NECMETTIN ERBAKAN IDENDITY, POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Modern Turkish Politics was built upon the absolute power of dominant military-civil-bureaucrat and elite class that inherited from İttihat Terakki Partisi (Party of Union and Progress). These dynamics upon which Turkish modernization was based formed a secular field and did not allow faith and moral preferences to be a political actor. The training of faith and moral determinants was tried to be carried out over bureaucratic tools. In this sense, it is likely to say that bureaucratic transcendentalism lies in the basis of the ongoing conflicts in Turkish political life. In the administration of national identity, the sense of despite the public for the public starting with the army-national will unity and the bureaucratic elite moving together with the public in the war of independence after that conflicting with the national values was adopted. The insufficiency of Kemalist paradigm in 1970s increased the emergence of Milli Görüş1 in Turkish political life. In the Kemalist national state system where religious identity was marginalized from social and political arena, the movement of Milli Görüş exhibited a case getting stuck between the religious identity and his roots with a political discourse. Milli Görüş appeared in the political arena together with a new language and “conceptualization” that could protect its political legitimization and transmit its message to the community within “the repressive limits”. Within this content, the architect of Milli Görüş movement, Necmettin Erbakan, developed a line comprising a multidimensionality and versatility with his political discourse paradigm. The language, expressions and party slogans Erbakan used in politics had a reference to the roots forming a nation as a subject rather than vague and uncertain discourses. In the current study, the political sense and leadership characteristics of Necmettin Erbakan, who determined the ideal of “The Greater Turkey Once Again” and “A New World” in the construction of Turkish political identity as a direction and target in Turkish Foreign Policy, and also the founder of D-8s (Developing Eights), was analysed in a multi-purposed way and the foreign policy in the period of Erbakan’s prime ministry was investigated.Modern Turkish Politics was built upon the absolute power of dominant military-civil-bureaucrat and elite class that inherited from İttihat Terakki Partisi (Party of Union and Progress). Keeping the rural area in the centre, this structure took over the function of protecting a political mission continually rather than being a practitioner of politics. With the abolition of Caliphate, Turkey adopted policies suitable for its new identity and got away rapidly from the Islamic world. Turkish modernization in multi-party era both during and following World War II kept its structure which was perceived as westernization and nonreligious position as a whole. The theses on which Turkish modernization depend are as follows in short: with the revolutions having a basis on the insufficiency of Islam, Ottoman Turkish community must be secularized and a generation must be grown with an ideology of western culture. Mind must be kept out of the control of religion, religion must be made up of dogmas and a percept not allowing to a critical thinking must be dominant. Religion must only be peculiar to faith and moral issues and it must not be allowed in politics. Economic resources a political power must be formed in a way that they must be controlled by certain people and a new alignment must be realized with a change of identity at the state. In this way, Turkish revolution is a real cultural revolution. Institutions and departments were redesigned over the effect of cultural imperialism and a social transformation was aimed. It is likely to say that bureaucratic transcendentalism lies in the basis of the ongoing conflicts in Turkish political life. The efforts of bureaucracy and intelligence to turn the temporary transcendentalist state into a bureaucratic permanent transcendentalist state lasted in the multi-party era between 1950 and 1980. The military coup attempts between the years 1960 and 1980 appeared in the form of the confrontational tensions between the right and left wing, not being able to democratize in politics, instability, and polarization and not being able to become civil. In the administration of national identity, the sense of despite the public for the public starting with the army-national will unity and the bureaucratic elite moving together with the public in the war of independence after that conflicting with the national values was adopted. In the process of Turkish modernization, it was aimed to force a “westernization” in the sense of social engineering with western theses by ignoring one-thousand-year history. The thesis of “imaginary modernization” emerging the project of modernizing a non-modern community by institutionalizing the secular realities of modernization at one night aimed at building a society out of history over the relationship of affirmation or refusal of one party and one leader. In this period, the seeking for a political opposition by disturbed and suffered mass was getting increased because of the fact that Islam was regarded as out of system. Kemalist ideology presented the form of modern, secular belonging of the state to the community as “the European Identity”. With this structure isolating political differences, Turkey was in a new position where it could not replace a new ideology when Kemalist paradigm was insufficient in 1970s. In this period, Milli Görüş emerged in Turkish politics as a different discourse from the ideologies of Westernization and Nationalism. In such an atmosphere, the coalition government of MSP (National Salvation Party) and CHP (Republican People’s Party) set up at the end of the general elections in 1973 had a protective impact against political polarizations despite some basic discrepancies. At that time, political communication caused by coalition was also reflected upon bureaucratic reflexes. The coalition demands of MSP for religious services were regarded well in the community in spite of bureaucratic elites. Milli Görüş parties faced Turkey realities which it regarded faith based political rights as “prohibitions”. Milli Görüş movement exhibits a position which is stuck between its political discourse and its religious identity and roots. However, the differentiation of Milli Görüş parties in their discourses and identity is not in its core but comes out as new “conceptualizations” that could protect its legitimacy within “prohibitive limits” and convey its message to the community. Political discourse paradigm of Necmettin Erbakan shows multidimension and variety. Socio-economic discourse power as well as religious and moral language comprise the core of the policies of parties. He developed a spiritualistic political language with his “Just Order” discourse by overcoming the reactions by large masses of community marginalizing religious tendencies in their identity section. Erbakan made a struggle for the acceptance of Islam as an “upper identity” in Turkish politics. In this way, while integrating systemic reactions to democratic system, he both reduced the anxiety of “inseparable unity” of the statesmen and made the religious and ethnic sensibilities be felt at the state politically. In this sense, he met the need for belonging on identity in a reasonable way. The rhetoric, expressions and party slogans Erbakan used in politics refers to the bases generating a nation as a subject rather than being vague and ambiguous discourses. In the context of building up the social identities of the language, the discourses of Necmettin Erbakan corresponds to the characteristic, fair, independent, developmentalist and spiritualist social tradition based on political actions. In this sense, the discourses of Necmettin Erbakan have “guiding” and “targeting” characteristics both in domestic and foreign politics and social life. In a period when politics lost its transparency and degenerated in Turkey and in the world, he put forward the ideal of “moral honesty” and “spiritual purification”. He took initiatives toward the public to have “justice in sharing” with the discourse of Just Order. With an emphasis on the Ottoman, he declared that “We are Muslims but we do not have to fight against the West, but we are different”. In a period when Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood was harmed, he highlighted “Islamic brotherhood”. He defended “a characteristic foreign policy” in international relations. Out of a different Islamic sense which was adopted as a state politics and supported in certain limits by the state, promising more religious freedom to Muslim majority and conveying the religious freedom demands of the masses to political arena, Necmettin Erbakan was marginalized throughout his political life in the ascribed system and tried to be pushed out of the system. However, pushing out of the system surprisingly made Erbakan and his parties stronger and repositioned them within the system. The most important contribution of Necmettin Erbakan to politics was in his keeping the masses he represented within the limits of legitimacy and out of extremity in the system at a reasonable level by guiding politics-community relations. This impact was mostly on the removal of the pressure on basic human rights and political rights, the provision of state-people coalescence and deepening the democracy culture accepting “the marginalized other”. What made Erbakan different from others was that his parties were closed down, his freedom was limited and that he carried on his struggle depending on the supremacy of law without exceeding the legitimate limit despite the political prohibitions. The reformatory strong paradigm of Erbakan on the mistakes of the system makes an emphasis on the transformative effect of the society as a whole by “a community advising the haqq (the right)”. He pointed out that the transformative potential of Milli Görüş / “Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) Rule” was firstly the potential of transforming central administration, in the second place, the potential of transforming the global system with D-8 (Developing Eight) project and the discourse of “A New World”, and thirdly the potential of transforming interest-based capital system through “pool system” and “balanced budget” applications in economy. The western and status-quoist approach in Turkish foreign policy perceived the differences as a thread towards it and a problem of regime. The crisis of February 28 against Refah Partisi and Erbakan was forced by these circles. The D-8 project initiated by Erbakan as a different act from the western status quo brought about the debates of axis in foreign policy. In this sense, D-8 was perceived as a challenge to the global system. As a matter of fact, even though D-8s was a strong claim as an alternative to the global system, it would not be true to say that it has a purpose of challenge with a conflicting sense. D-8 was an organization focusing on economy and development that would provide a just and whole development on earth with the discourses of “not war but peace”, “not conflict but dialogue”, “not double standards but justice”, “not superiority but equality”, “not exploitation but just order”, “not pressure and dominance but human rights, freedom and democracy”. When it comes to D-60 and D-160 targets of Erbakan, it is likely to see that D-8s comprise the core of “A Just New World” in order not to allow all humanity to be exploited and to help them live in a humanly way. The D-8 establishment led by Erbakan as a founder is a foundation constructed on intellectual and economic bases, which is able to play a great role in world peace and economic development of the member countries. It is a historical reality that the joint action with the same common target has always had a conclusion. However, it is a must that the aim determined by the leaders be turned into the purpose of the states as well. For that reason, two basic criteria in international affairs carried out on behalf of the state are of importance; the reason why the states come together and a strong common ground. The political will and bureaucracy harmony is certainly a significant factor in the success for foreign policy. The leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the acting Prime Minister, in the Peace Operation in Cyprus in 1974 on decision making and the unity of army-politics, particularly with the Head of General Staff, Semih Sancar at that time, revealed itself and a crucial success and victory was achieved in Turkish Foreign Policy. However, founded by the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1997, D8 was precluded in a conjectural way and failed. Once the barriers are lifted, D-8s has a potential to be able to carry on its walk. Erbakan put forward a new sense foreign policy and perspective in terms of Turkey both in intellectual and practical plans. Even though the Erbakan government developed vision policies against the western identity dream in Turkish foreign policy, his short ten-month power was not able to form an alternative structure for the sustainability. However, the fact that Refah Partisi had a long term changing potential in Turkish foreign policy and that Erbakan founded D-8s in a very short time and was able to activate the dynamics of Islamic world despite all their weaknesses made certain groups concerned. For the first time, Turkey followed a different path from her allies in foreign policy in NATO. In this period when national profits preceded to ideologies, the insistence of the western minded dynamic powers in Turkey over “the fact that no ideological compromise must be given for the sake of some economic gains” and their interventionist attitudes brought about the punishment of the public. Necmettin Erbakan had vision leadership highlighted by his decisive and characteristic stand in foreign policy. He drew the direction of “A New Just World” by coming together with the leader and representatives of Muslim communities every year in order to set up an alternative unity with Islamic states. The views of Erbakan in foreign policy was in line with “Just Order” and “Milli Görüş” which was regarded as an anti-Western-Zionism movement and a symbol of standing against imperialism. Erbakan developed his policy over improving closer political relations with the neighbour countries with which Turkey has historical and cultural ties, protecting the rights of oppressed Muslim communities and of Turks outside Turkey. He was aiming at reconsidering Turkish nationalism which is the ideology of nation state depending on OttomanIslamic past in Turkish foreign policy and repositioning it in terms of Islamic identity, so reviving spiritual heritage. This consideration was echoed in close relations of Turkey. He was against EU as there is an emphasis on the Christian unity in its founding principle and stood aloof from it since he thought that EU imposed destructive political, social and economic policies on Turkey which they see as the other, has never kept its promise and never been sincere. Nevertheless, he believed that respectability in civil and commercial relations must be preserved and carried on. Erbakan pointed out that Turkey must have a strong military force and the relations with NATO in changing global politics must be redefined. NATO lost it feature of being a defence pact after 1990s particularly after September 11 and defined Islamic countries as a new target for NATO. Erbakan was the first leader to attract attention on the fact that imperialist west turned their enemy definition from red to green, and on the approaching danger for the Islamic countries. He proved with a great many projects and radical steps in foreign policy that he was not only an ideologist but also a good practitioner. Such quite radical ideas and projects as “Just Order”, “Heavy Industry”, “Islamic Union, “Islamic United Nations”, and “Common Islamic Monetary Currency”, “Islamic Security Pact”, “A New World” that had been introduced from the first political days of Necmettin Erbakan onwards constitute the basic inspiration sources of the seeking for “The Greater Turkey Once Again” today. In one year when the Government of Refah-Yol (the coalition between Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)) was on the power, it did not take any other radical change in domestic and international politics except for D-8 difference. It did not initiate any new politics different from the earlier government in such issues as NATO membership that constitutes the basis of Turkish – American relations, institutional and political affairs like military cooperation, Arab-Israeli peace process and Iraq problem. On the other hand, it was known that the ideology of Refah Partisi had some potential factors likely to change the domestic and international policy of Turkey radically in the long term. These potential factors could be able to canalize the foreign policy of Turkey in particular to a regional and Islamic world centred axis in general sense. One of the targets of the Refah -Yol government of PM Erbakan was to realize the relations with Iraq gradually. In this sense, an active and independent policy was followed in order to find a solution for the Northern Iraq problem and American Poised Hammer which was regarded as the source of terror in Northern Iraq and positioned in the region for the security of Israel was abolished. D-8 initiative aimed at developing relations in such countries as Iran and Nigeria having some strains in their relations with the western countries. In this way, the integration of these countries could be integrated to international community. This case was not considered well by USA and Israel. The governments of these two countries opposed to the Islamic based politics of Refah Partisi such that in addition to the crypto messages coming from USA, Israeli President Weissman put an emphasis on secularism and was able to utter that Turkey must get rid of Refah Partisi at all costs with his words “Demirel is my close friend and I am sure that he will do his best to prevent it and the army will not stay silent, as well”. Some military groups having been influenced by foreign powers against Erbakan’s politics both developed their relations with Israel and also declared Iran as a terrorist country in different circles. The dose of domestic and international attempt increased gradually in order to force Erbakan to trouble in foreign policy. On the other, it is not likely to say that Erbakan was willing to develop the relations with European Union and USA. The voices of those perceiving as an indication of instability increased and they started to hold demonstrations exceeding the limits of legitimacy. As a matter of fact, while Abdullah Gül, the state minister in the Refah Partisi cabinet, was giving good will messages over the relations with the USA in Washington, the Deputy President of General Staff, Çevik Bir was giving messages in the USA at the same date over the fact that the tie of Turkey with the West would never be cut off and the stability in domestic and foreign would be obtained. These messages reminded us the former military coups by Turkish Armed Forces taking over the administration of the governments causing instability with the West. In this sense, the unit made up of “Western Study Group” started to give briefings for various occupational groups in order to make the Refah – Yol Government down and driving tanks in Sincan, the central town of Ankara, was defined as “wheel balancing”. The purpose of a post-modern coup against a legitimate and successful government was to provide the sustainability of Turkish – American relations and the role of Turkey within the alliance of the West and preserving the status quo. Erbakan considered this process as a game of global imperialism and Zionism over Turkey. Within this perspective, the USA and the West supported certain domestic powers in cooperation in order to cause some strains and polarizations that would tighten the ability of Erbakan Government to act. Erbakan was a leader eliminating such dualism as right and left wing in politics, challenging the mistakes of current system, bringing applicable alternatives, so regarded as the other of the system. For that reason, western elite groups regarded Erbakan as a handicap for themselves. His religious devotedness, economic development, rapidly industrialization and his actions and discourses on international political affairs did not match up with the interests of the elitist groups both in Turkey and in the world. His closed parties, political prohibitions was not able to divert him from his path. As these coarse applications did not yield result, different projects and prohibition were started to push Erbakan out of politics. According to Necmettin Erbakan, Milli Görüş is a spiritual, intellectual and action movement prioritizing haqq, preserving peace, protecting the rights of humans, refusing racism, defending religious freedom in perfect sense, determining basic principles in every fielding ranging from economy to defence, from industry to education, from science and technology to law, from municipal affairs to civil community, refusing being slave to human being, uprising the injustice in income distribution, standing against any kind of exploitation, demanding the rights and justice for everyone, pulling Turkey into its origin just like a towing boat. In this design of “Milli Görüş”, Turkey had a characteristic of being the only potential leader to Islamic world. With Milli Görüş the principles of which he determined as a political action, Erbakan presents to Turkey and all humanity the ideal of “The Greater Turkey Once Again” and “A New World”. Leaders are evaluated with what they left behind. Walking in front of the community as a period, leaders are perceived better after their demise. Their identity walks around us. Their communal belongings sometimes emerge in an unexpected time and regulates the system. Guiding the Turkish politics, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of Milli Görüş, has a feature of being one of the leaders to be talked about the most in the future just like today with his wise charismatic leadership, politics and ideas.

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