İslamcılık,19.yy'den itibaren varlık göstermeye başlamış ve dünyada Arap Yarımadasında Müslüman Kardeşler, Hint alt kıtasında Cemaat-i İslami ve Anadolu İslamcılığı olmak üzere üç ana kol üzerinden biçimlenmiştir. İlk kez Osmanlı İslamcıları ile görünürlük kazanan Anadolu İslamcılığı, Cumhuriyetin ilanıyla bir dönem perde arkasında faaliyet gösterirken, 1969 yılında Necmettin Erbakan'ın Konya'dan bağımsız milletvekili olması ve Milli Görüş'üteşkilatlandırmaya başlamasıyla resmileşmiştir. Türkiye'de faaliyet gösteren pek çok İslamcı yapıdan farklı olarak Milli Görüş'ün en önemli özelliği, toplumsal şiddet olaylarının en yoğun olduğu zamanlara ya da İran devrimi ile birlikte aktivistleşen İslamcı gündeme rağmen, hiçbir dönem şiddete bulaşmaması ve demokratik sistem içinde kalarak iktidara gelebilmiş olmasıdır. Dört partisinin (Milli Nizam, Milli Selamet, Refah, Fazilet Partileri) kapatılmış olması karşısında da tavrını değiştirmeyen Milli Görüş, bütün İslamcı yapılar içerisinde önemli ve ayrıcalıklı bir laboratuvar olma özelliği taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmada dini radikalizmin kuramsal çerçevesinden yola çıkılarak ortaya konulan temel iddia; İslami siyasal perspektifin doğru yönlendirildiği takdirde, radikalizm üretmeyeceği ve örnek olarak da Milli Görüş'ün radikalleşmemesinin altında yatan nedenler dört ana başlıkta incelenecektir: Türkiye'nin özgün koşullarından kaynaklanan nedenler, liderlik faktörü ve İslam'ı algılama biçimi, teşkilatlanma ve son olarak Milli Görüş'ün ideolojik verileri. Çalışma kapsamında bu dört temel noktadan hareketle, Milli Görüş'ün diğer İslamcı/İslami yapılardan ayrıldığı noktalar ortaya konularak dini radikalizmin engellenmesine yönelik nesnel çıktıların sağlanması amaçlanmaktadır

Islamism has come out since 19th century and formed in three branches in the world namely “Muslim Brother”s in Arabic Peninsula, “Cemaat-iIslami” in Indian subcontinent and Anatolian Islamism. Anatolian Islamism, which became visible firstly by Ottoman Islamists, became active at the backstage for a while after the proclamation of the republic. After NecmettinErbakan had become independent member of the parliament from Konya in 1969, he started to organize “MilliGörüş” and then it became official. Unlike many Islamic formations which are active in Turkey, the most important feature of “MilliGörüş” is that it hasn’t involved in violence, even during the times when social violence were very intense or during the time when Islamic agenda became activist with Iran revolution, and it came into power by staying at democratic system. MilliGörüş which didn’t change his attitude, even though four of his political parties (National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party) were closed, has an important role and has a feature of being a distinguished laboratory in all of the Islamic formations. Starting out from the theoretical framework of religious radicalism, the main argument of this study is that, if Islamic political perspective is led properly it won’t bring radicalism and “MilliGörüş” can be shown as a sample. With in this context, the reasons behind the radicalization of “MilliGörüş” will be studied in four main points. The reasons generating from the Turkey’s typical conditions are the factor of leadership and the approach of perception of Islam, organization and the lastly MilliGörüş’s ideological data. Within the content of the study starting out from these four main points, by putting forward the differences of MilliGörüş from the other Islamist/Islamic formation, it is aimed to reach objective outcomes to prevent religious radicalism Although there is no commonly accepted definition in the literature, to express the adoption of a more or less coherent system of thinking and an anticipation of the future imitation and the use of force and / or violence as a method for dealing with at least one area of opposition to at least one area of common accepted norms in social, political and economic spheres" . In other words, it can be defined as radicalism by opposing the existing one and trying to place a new order through the use of force and / or violence. To make a conceptual distinction, the state of being opposed to a mainstream social, political, and economic current must be defined by the concept of extremism instead of radicalism. It also emerges as the first step in the production of radicalism. When extremism is accompanied by political or social activism, a distinction is made between radicalism and activism. Radicalism is activism, which is the next or simultaneous step that produces violence or tends to produce violence. However, it is unlikely that every activism will necessarily turn into radicalism. Since radicalism is inherently system oriented, the use of violence or force produced by it is also system-oriented, so it does not lead to civilians, nor is it systematic or persistent. When radicalism begins to practice violence against civilians, it turns into terrorism. In this context, terrorism is the next phase in which radicalism produces systematic and persistent violence against both the state and the civilians. However, it should be noted again; Every radicalism can not be expected to evolve into terrorism. Religious radicalism can be defined as a form of radicalism that legitimizes a conviction system as criticism of system dynamics through political arguments and to legitimize use of violence and / or power as a method - whether preaching a belief system or not - through religious arguments, planning to make a faith-based change in the present system. In fact, the factors that could lead to religious radicalism have six main reasons: 1. Political environment: a) The dissatisfaction created by secular or pro-Western governments for Muslims and the upset of public policies and politics produced by these administrations failing to meet religious expectations: "The state does not allow religious life!" b) Lack of political representation and inability or lack of political mechanisms that will transmit demands to the political arena: "I am not represented!" c) Inability or legal barriers for creating non-governmental organizations: "I can not express myself!" d) The limitation or absence of freedom of religion, or the state pressures on the freedom of religion: "I can not pray!" 2. Individual status: a) The quest for identity: "I exist with my belief, for what I believe, as long as I believe!" b) Individual weakness as an : "I am strong with believers like me!" c) Prove yourself: "I am ready for my beliefs!" d) Socio-economic deprivation and inadequate education: "because of you!" 3. Religious political goals a) Religious transformation practice in political structure: "The state for my belief, absolutely!" b) Defeat the west: "Now, it’s our turn!" c) Realizing the goal of politicized beliefs such as Promised Land or Golden Age of Islam:"my belief is my future!" d) Religious literal interpretation: "Each writing is an order!" 4. Social reasons: a) Being differentiated or excluded: "I am here!" b) Unable to adapt to the majority: "I do not believe that!" c) Immigration and integration problems: "My belief is good, but it’s up to you!" 5. Philosophical Causes a) Reaction to modernity and its institutions: “sole truth is my belief!" b) Globalization: "we are bigger now!" In the radicalization that began with the combination of a few of these causes, the individual is accusing external factors as a source of problems, and is now making a strong judgment that the in-system means do not work to destroy them. When these factors disappear, the suggestion of establishing a believed / promised future brings individual,MilliGörüş, which embraces geographically, Anatolia, historically the Ottoman heritage based on the consciousness of "ummah", as a concept of Koran, leads the fight against the present order created by the Void, by evaluating politics within the framework of the fight between Right-Void, and has an ideological program that advocates the Islamic economy as an economic system, as well as multi-judicial system as a social structure. It is very important that MilliGörüş (National Opinion), which has interiorized the Islamic arguments more intensely than many radical forms that define itself as "Islamist", has not produced radicalism. In this context, the fact that National Opinion does not produce radicalism or radicalization can be attributed to four main reasons. The first reason can be evaluated in the context of the original conditions of Turkey. Beyond having a radical secularist experience, the authenticity of the Turkish experience in relation to other Muslim countries is the most important characteristic, as democrat and right liberal tradition has begun to redevelop since 1946 and thus Islamic identity and rhetoric have found a legitimate basis within the political stage. (Göle, 2008: 54). In this context, entry of MNP, the first party of MilliGörüş, into the political arena to prevent the alienation of conservative people. On the contrary, if MNP was not established and MilliGörüş had not entered the political arena, the growth of radicalizing political power of religious mass would have resulted not only from the qualitative characteristics of the system but also from the fact that they would have felt "used" by mainstream parties. In this context, MilliGörüş has transferred both the identity and the demands of the Islamic group related to the system to the political arena and meanwhile prevented the Islamic current from melting in the central nationalist right, in the political arena. Secondly, it can be observed that the leadership factor and the form of religious interpretation are the most important factor in the nonradicalization of the MilliGörüş. In this context, the role and way of religious interpretation of NecmettinErbakan, the first leader of MilliGörüş, can be summarized in ten points: 1. The fact that the criticism of the religious field shared between the politics of the nationalist center and the state, the religious politics produced and the application of these policies, that the Islamic group complain about, was carried out by a well-educated, successful academy "teacher" descended from aristocratic family has created a sense of self-confidence on this group. 2. Since the political discourse of Erbakan was not pragmatist but Islamic in nature and content, he could speak the same language that he was leading. Although he had to use "bird language" because of the state pressure, his rhetoric has made it a special and continuous form of communication. 3. His political arguments and goals were generated against Zionism/racist imperialism, which represents the Void in the fight RightVoid, and did not aim directly at people and institutions. 4. The jihad he uses as a method is not performed by the sword in the context of Islamic terminology, but by language and intelligence. In this sense, Erbakan considers politics as jihad. Jihad, therefore, is not used for legitimating violence. 5. As a term, it has a strong Islamic background that takes its source from Sunni NakşiEko. For this reason, he does not advocate changes based on force like revolution. He believes that change must take place gradually and slowly and is therefore strong enough to keep the mass in politics. 6. He interprets politics as a long-standing field of religious struggle. For this reason, against system pressures, he is calming and relaxing the Islamic group. According to Erbakan, the remedy is not to fight but to continue debating politically. 7. There is a strong ummah consciousness, so it is integrative. Instead of repulsing, he suggests the mass an Islamic Union under Turkey's leadership. Even when it was in power, he made his first overseas trip to Iran, where there was a deep political division, and established the D-8. In this sense, there is only one other for Erbakan and the followers: Superstitious! 8. The real fight against superstition, not through violence but the 2nd Yalta Conference that will be gathered, he suggested. Therefore, from the beginning to the end, there is no violence at all in the fight. 9. He's an organizer. Through regular meetings that he has participated in and tightly held relationship networks, he has prevented the extremity of the individuals and provided the necessary motivation. 10. He used the form of prophetic communication (face to face). Thus, by being touchable and reachable, he has made the individuals to identify. Thirdly, in the context of organization, perhaps the greatest success of MilliGörüş is that it is broadly and extensively structured so that it does not make supporters feel alone in terms of representation and solidarity. The Foundations and Organizations of MilliGörüş (MİLKO), which were created for the inclusion of almost all segments of the society in the way of Erbakan was saying "embracing the society with 40 arms" enabled the individuals to influence the system not only through politics but also due to their activities. Moreover, even when the national opinion was not in power, it became an important intermediation to participate in the system and receive feedback and has strengthened the representation rate. Fourthly, MilliGörüş, which affirms that it takes place in the political arena to establish Islam in the name of Islamic civilization in terms of ideological background, it wanted to gradually fight starting in Turkey, then Islamic world and finally for all the oppressed nations and establish the "Fair Order". It has defended the foundation of a United Nations organization based on the Right (Islam) to overcome the international political instability which is the obstacle to achieving the ultimate goal, and the establishment of a religious ethical system to eliminate social problems and wars, and also justified a fair relative representation to deal with democratic problems. In addition, he declared that he was opposed to the use of force and violence, which means oppression, in order that any thought or belief, regardless of source, be accepted by others (Erbakan, 1975: 32). He acknowledged in principle that the idea which have been expressed in good faith should be responded to with an idea and thanked as long as it does not include violence. (Erbakan, 1991a, 165). As a result, despite the fact that MilliGörüş is an ideological chain that operates according to the principles of Islam and which claims Islamic transformation and restructuring, as a political party on Islamic basis, has proven that it may have taken a place in politics, administration and economy as an alternative, and may have come to power by democratic methods different from other Muslim countries, in particular with the role of NecmettinErbakan. At this point, in addition to the predominance of leadership, three functions were accomplished: first of all, in politics, expanding the boundaries of the monopolized religious area by the state and center right politics and including them to the political sphere due to its organization and gathering of ideological program, secondly making the Islamic life and politics visible, and finally changing the perception of the Islamic people about the state and power. Therefore, it has prevented the legitimacy of violence and terrorism by providing political trust of the religious group who are radically charged when face of the conditions arising out of the political and social conjecture.